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Sommario
In questa tesi, viene effettuata un’analisi teorica destinata allo sviluppo di algoritmi
distribuiti (decentralizzati) per il controllo di potenza, progettati per reti wireless
ad elevato throughput che utilizzano la tecnologia ultrawideband (UWB). In questo
contesto, viene fatto uso della teoria dei giochi, la quale si rivela particolarmente utile
per derivare tecniche di controllo di potenza che siano distribuite, scalabili ed efficienti
dal punto di vista energetico, e pertanto particolarmente indicate per terminali mobili
operanti in uno scenario multipath. Piu` nel dettaglio, il problema del controllo di
potenza e` modellato come un gioco noncooperativo, nel quale ciascun utente decide il
livello di potenza in trasmissione in modo da massimizzare la sua utilita`, definita come
il rapporto tra throughput e potenza trasmessa. Sebbene sia noto che uno schema
di controllo distribuito (noncooperativo) sia subottimo nei confronti di una soluzione
centralizzata (cooperativa), mediante un’analisi di tipo large-system viene evidenziato
che la degradazione dell’algoritmo basato sull’equilibrio di Nash risulta trascurabile
rispetto allo schema centralizzato. Il modello teorico sviluppato in questa tesi e` in
grado di analizzare le prestazioni di altri sistemi wireless a larga banda, tra cui le reti
che fanno uso dell’accesso multiplo a suddivisione di codice (code division multiple
access, CDMA). In particolare, e` possibile dimostrare che la tecnologia UWB fornisce
prestazioni leggermente superiori rispetto al CDMA in termini di utilita` all’equilibrio
di Nash.
Abstract
This thesis describes a theoretical framework for the design and the analysis of
distributed (decentralized) power control algorithms for high-throughput wireless
networks using ultrawideband (UWB) technologies. The tools of game theory are
shown to be expedient for deriving scalable, energy-efficient, distributed power con-
trol schemes to be applied to a population of battery-operated user terminals in
a rich multipath environment. In particular, the power control issue is modeled
as a noncooperative game in which each user chooses its transmit power so as to
maximize its own utility, which is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power.
Although distributed (noncooperative) control is known to be suboptimal with respect
to the optimal centralized (cooperative) solution, it is shown via large-system analysis
that the game-theoretic distributed algorithm based on Nash equilibrium exhibits
negligible performance degradation with respect to the centralized socially optimal
configuration. The framework described here is general enough to also encompass the
analysis of code division multiple access (CDMA) systems and to show that UWB
slightly outperforms CDMA in terms of achieved utility at the Nash equilibrium.
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Introduction
Motivations
Since the early days of wireless communications, the importance of radio resource
management (RRM) has emerged as a key issue in network design. A typical example
of RRM is represented by power control , whose principal purpose is to provide each
signal in the network with adequate quality without causing unnecessary interference
to other users in the system. Cochannel interference, which is due to the shared nature
of the wireless medium, represents in fact a major impairment to the performance of
wireless communications.
The first schemes that aim to achieve this goal in the field of spread spectrum
(SS) satellite communications were the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)-
balancing algorithms (also called power balancing algorithms), proposed in the early
1970s by Aein [1] and Meyerhoff [86]. Until mid-1990s, power control techniques were
primarily focused on voice communications systems [2, 58, 94, 95, 139, 140]. In this
context, distributed schemes such as the one proposed by Foschini and Miljanic [46],
have proved to achieve excellent performance. For this kind of applications, SINR-
balancing schemes are in fact particularly suitable, since voice users are usually
indifferent to small changes in their SINRs. In other words, the level of satisfaction
perceived by each user shows a simple, threshold-like zero-one relationship with the
level of SINR measured at the receiver. Hence, the optimum power control scheme
for wireless telephone networks is the algorithm that maximizes the number of con-
versations that can simultaneously achieve a certain quality of service (QoS) target.
With the advent of the third-generation cellular networks, high-speed data services
have become available to the mobile population and the spectacular success of wireless
data applications in the last few years has produced an ever-increasing demand for
reliable high-speed data services. These market drivers have generated a number of
2 Introduction
new technologies that provide multiple access capability and possibly interference mit-
igation. Ultrawideband (UWB) communication has emerged as a possible solution for
next-generation short-range high-speed data transmission, due to its large spreading
factor (which implies large multiuser capacity) and low power spectral density (which
allows coexistence with incumbent systems in the same frequency bands).
The main difference with respect to conventional narrowband or wideband networks
thoroughly studied in the literature is represented by the frequency selectivity of
the wireless channel, which is due to the extremely high temporal resolution of the
transmitted signals. This motivates us to study the effect of such frequency selectivity
when applying power control schemes to UWB-based networks.
Unlike voice applications, data communications are intolerant of errors and require
a larger SINR. Higher SINRs lead to a lesser number of retransmissions, which
translates into a larger amount of information correctly delivered at the receiver. As a
consequence, the level of satisfaction achieved by each user is a continuous function of
the SINR [55]. Throughout this thesis, we focus on energy efficient criteria for power
control, which aim at maximizing the number of transmitted bits per energy unit
rather than the pure maximization of the throughput of the link. This is mainly due
to the presence of battery-powered mobile terminals in the network, which calls for
careful management of the energy consumption. This goal can be achieved through
application of a noncooperative game wherein the users are allowed to choose their
transmit powers according to a utility-maximization criterion, where the utility is
defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power.
Recently, game theory has been used as an effective tool to study distributed power
control in data networks. An important feature of the game-theoretic approach is
the inherent decentralization of the algorithms for power control, which allows each
user to individually choose its own transmit power through a simple noncooperative
scheme. Distributed (noncooperative) solutions are in general suboptimal with respect
to those obtained via a centralized (cooperative) approach, but they are particularly
well suited to a largely populated network due to their intrinsic scalability. The
centralized approach is often characterized by NP-hard problems, whose solutions
cannot be reasonably computed (or even approximated) in real-time.
The prominent characteristic of the game-theoretic approach, which justifies its
widespread range of applications, is its capability of distributing decision-making
processes among “rational” users [77], once benefits and drawbacks of the actions
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they are allowed to choose are quantified. Even though game theory was originally
developed to predict the outcome of interactions among economic agents, it is ap-
parent that this framework also fits the situation of resource competition in wireless
networks.
There is a substantial literature on power control techniques based on noncoopera-
tive game theory, mostly focused on code division multiple access (CDMA) wireless
communication networks [5,36,55,71,85,110,122,134]. In this thesis, we will address
the problem of game-theoretic power control for wideband wireless communication
systems operating in a frequency selective scenario, which include both UWB-based
and CDMA-based networks.
Main contributions
This thesis is focused on the application of noncooperative game theory to power
control in the uplink of (ultra)wideband infrastructure wireless communication net-
works. Due to the large bandwidths of the transmitted signals, the channel fading
is assumed to be frequency selective, and a set of Rake receivers at the access point
is employed. By posing the energy efficiency of the power control algorithm as the
key requirement of the system, we devise a game-theoretic model for the distributed
power control scheme. This analysis is general enough to also encompass the study
of CDMA systems.
In this context, the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• the derived framework extends the results available in the literature for energy-
efficient approaches in flat-fading scenarios;
• the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of the noncooperative power
control game (the Nash equilibrium) are proved by means of the analytical tools
of game theory and distributed control theory;
• an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the Nash solution of the
power control scheme is derived, and its convergence is studied theoretically
and validated by numerical examples;
• the effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference are characterized
in terms of the relevant parameters of the network through a large-system
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analysis; the results are derived for a general channel model, which includes
both large- and small-scale statistics, and are independent of the single channel
realizations;
• system design criteria, such as the minimum spreading factor of the network and
the performance loss of partial-Rake receivers with respect to all-Rake receivers,
are proposed;
• the performance of the distributed solution (the Nash equilibrium) is compared
with the centralized (social-optimal) solution, showing that the difference be-
tween these two approaches is not significant for typical networks;
• the performance of UWB-based networks is compared to CDMA-based net-
works, showing that UWB slightly outperforms CDMA in terms of achieved
utility at the Nash equilibrium.
Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.
In Chapter 1, we introduce the fundamental tools of noncooperative game theory.
In particular, we outline the basic concepts of static and dynamic games. We then
provide motivating examples for the application of noncooperative game theory to
power control problems, and we review the literature on game-theoretic power control
in wireless networks.
In Chapter 2, we describe the system considered throughout the thesis. After a brief
introduction of UWB technology, we present the analytical models for transmitter
side, wireless channel and receiver side, respectively. We then discuss the relevant
features of the described system and we identify why effective power control techniques
are particularly desirable in this scenario.
In Chapter 3, we formally introduce the power control problem for UWB-based
wireless networks as a noncooperative game. After discussing the main advantages of
distributed solutions, we formulate the power control scheme using an energy-efficient
approach. We then study the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of
the proposed game, and we describe an iterative algorithm to reach the Nash solution
in a distributed fashion.
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In Chapter 4, we identify the main properties of the Nash solution of the power
control game. To derive explicit expressions for the relevant quantities of the system,
namely transmit powers and achieved utilities, we propose a large-system analysis of
the network. This framework allows us to obtain a theoretical description of both
the self-interference and the multiple-access interference, which are independent of
the particular channel realization. Using these asymptotical values, we measure the
performance indexes and we derive some system design criteria. We also show the
results of extensive simulations that validate the proposed analysis.
In Chapter 5, we compare the distributed (noncooperative) solution (the Nash
equilibrium) with the centralized (cooperative) solution (the social optimum) in terms
of achieved utilities. Using the large-system analysis developed in Chapter 4, we
measure the performance loss of the distributed approach. We then compare this
theoretical analysis with the numerical results, and we draw some conclusions about
advantages and flaws of the noncooperative solution.
In Chapter 6, we adapt the game-theoretic framework described in the previous
chapters to the case of a wideband wireless network using CDMA as the multiple
access technique. We then perform a comparison between UWB-based and CDMA-
based networks. Performance of the two access methods is evaluated in both the
frequency-selective and in the flat-fading scenario. By means of both theoretical and
numerical results, we show that the UWB technology slightly outperforms CDMA in
terms of achieved utilities.
In Chapter 7, we draw some conclusions for this thesis and we discuss open issues
and further perspectives for this research field.
Chapter 1
Basics of noncooperative
game theory
Game theory is a broad field of applied mathematics aimed at describing and analyzing
interactive decision processes. In particular, it provides the analytical tools to predict
the outcome of complex interactions among rational entities, where rationality calls for
strict adherence to a strategy based on perceived or measured results [98]. Economists
have long used game theory as a framework for examining the actions of economic
agents such as firms in a market. In recent years, it has been extensively used to
address many optimization problems in the field of communication engineering and
computer science.
This chapter contains an introduction to the fundamental tools of noncooperative
game theory. After a brief chronology of game theory, given in Sect. 1.1, the basic
concepts of static and dynamic games are outlined in Sects. 1.2 and 1.3, respectively.
Finally, Sect. 1.4 provides a survey of the relevant applications of noncooperative
game theory to the problem of power control in wireless network.
1.1 Historical notes
The first studies of games in the economics literature were the papers by Cournot
(1838) [32], Bertrand (1883) [19], and Edgeworth (1897) [35] on oligopoly pricing
and production.1 However, these contributions were seen as special models that
1Although these works are commonly acknowledged as the first problems stated in a game-
theoretic framework, similar approaches in the context of card games can be found in the 18th
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did little to change the way economists thought about most problems. The idea
of a general theory of games can be dated to 1928, when von Neumann set forth
the basis for this discipline as a unique field [128], and culminated in 1944, when
von Neumann and Morgenstern published their famous book “Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior” [129], which proposed that most economic questions should be
analyzed as games.
Noncooperative game theory is a branch of game theory which studies interactions
among agents that are not able to form binding commitments. Hence, it analyzes the
behavior of agents in any situation in which each agent’s optimal choice may depend
on his/her forecast of the choices of his/her opponents. Before 1950, limitations in
the mathematical framework of noncooperative game theory made it applicable only
under special and limited conditions.2 In this period, the research was primarily
focused on cooperative game theory, which analyzes optimal strategies for groups of
individuals, assuming that they can enforce agreements among themselves.
Seminal contributions to both cooperative and noncooperative game theory were
given in 1950-53 by Nash [90–93]. In the context of noncooperative game theory, in
1950 Nash proposed what came to be known as the Nash equilibrium as a way of
extending game theory analyses to non-zero-sum games [91]. The Nash equilibrium
requires that each player’s strategy in the game be a payoff-maximizing response to
the strategy that he/she forecasts that his/her opponents will use, and further that
each player’s forecast be correct. This is a natural generalization of the equilibria
studied in specific models by Cournot and Bertrand, and it is the starting point for
most economic analyses.
Since then, game theory has been a subject of considerable study, so that several
concepts were deeply studied and understood. Among the others, Selten (1965) [113]
and Harsanyi (1967-68) [61] introduced concepts that have been widely used in recent
years. Selten argued that in games where the player choose contingent plans, not
all the Nash equilibria are equally reasonable, because some of them may rely on
the ability of players to make contingent plans that would not in fact be optimal
century [18]. Oddly enough, Aumann and Maschler showed that a recommendation given by the
Babylonian Talmud (0-500 A.D.) anticipates some of the results of modern game theory [9].
2In [129], von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that a solution (the minmax solution) exists
in a special class of strictly noncooperative games, the two-player zero-sum games, in which the
interests of the players are directly opposed, with no common interests at all.
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to carry out. Selten introduced his concept of subgame perfection to rule out the
equilibria that rely on this kind of threats. Harsanyi proposed a way to use standard
game-theoretic techniques to model situations where the players are unsure of one
another’s payoff. His Bayesian Nash equilibrium represents the cornerstone of many
game-theoretic analyses.
Traditionally, the main areas of application have been economics, political science,
biology, and sociology. Since the early 1990s, engineering and computer science
have been added to the list. Recently, game theory has also been widely used in
telecommunications and wireless communications [8, 39, 76].
The remainder of this chapter contains a brief description of the main tools to analyze
game-theoretic problems. A comprehensive treatment of basic and advanced topics
in noncooperative game theory can be found in [48,53,98]. For a detailed analysis of
cooperative game theory, please refer to [98].
1.2 Static games
In the game-theoretic context, a game can be defined as “a description of strategic
interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players take and the
players’ interests” [98]. In this scenario, the basic entity is represented by the player ,
who can be thought of as an individual or as a group of individuals making a decision.
If the actions taken by each player are chosen individually, then the game is referred
to as noncooperative. Alternatively, if the actions of each group of players are chosen
jointly, then the game is referred to as cooperative. As motivated later in the text,
throughout this thesis we will focus on noncooperative games only.
The existence of many possible formulations of a game can easily be argued from
the general definition provided above. The simpler type of a game is represented
by the static game, which follows this form: first, the players simultaneously choose
their actions; and then, the players receive their own payoffs that depend on the
combination of actions just chosen by all players.3 Within the class of such static (or
simultaneous-move) games, we restrict attention to games of complete information.
The concept of complete information implies that each player’s payoff function (the
3Actually, a static game does not imply that the parties necessarily act simultaneously: as better
stated in Sect. 1.3, it suffices that each player chooses his/her own action without knowledge of the
others’ choices.
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function that determines the player’s payoff from the combination of actions chosen
by all the players) is common knowledge between all the players. Games of incomplete
information, also called Bayesian games, are not considered in this thesis.
1.2.1 Strategic-form representation
A game in strategic (or normal) form consists of three components:
(1) a set of players;
(2) a set of actions (strategies) available to each player;
(3) the payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that could
be chosen by the players.
In its mathematical formulation, a K-player game can be represented as follows [53]:
Definition 1 The strategic-form representation of a game can be denoted by G =
[K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], where:
(1) K = {1, . . . ,K} is the finite set of players;
(2) Ak is the set of pure strategies (actions) available to player k; and
(3) uk (a) is the utility (payoff) for player k.
The set of pure strategies Ak (often referred to as player k’s pure-strategy space)
represents the space of all the possible strategies that player k can choose. Based on
the nature of the pure-strategy space, two different types of game can be identified:
• finite games , i.e., games where the joint set of strategy space A = A1× . . .×AK
is finite, or, equivalently, where the number of actions is countable;
• infinite games , i.e., games where the number of actions is uncountable.
For the ease of presentation, the examples provided in the following involve finite
games. However, as can be seen in the next chapters, the major results of this thesis
focus on infinite games.
The strategy chosen by player k can be expressed as ak ∈ Ak. When considering a
pure-strategy space, there exists a deterministic relationship that assigns each player
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k a certain strategy ak. The set of strategies chosen by all players in the game
constitutes the pure-strategy profile a = [a1, . . . , aK ].
This approach can be extended by resorting to a mixed strategy ξk ∈ Ξk, where Ξk
is the mixed-strategy space, and ξk is a probability distribution over player k’s pure
strategy. In other words, ξk is a probability distribution that assigns a probability
ξk(ak) to each action ak. Note that the set of mixed strategies contains the pure-
strategy space, as degenerate probability distributions are included. In fact, ak can
be simply obtained when ξk assigns zero probability to all actions but ak. As can
be better seen in the next chapters, this thesis is primarily focused on pure-strategy
games. As a consequence, mixed strategies are not discussed in the remainder of this
section. However, it should be noted that mixed strategies play a key role in all game-
theoretic aspects, as will be clearly stated in Sect. 1.2.2. For a detailed discussion,
please refer to [48, 98].
The utility achieved by each player is a function that measures his/her level of
satisfaction. Clearly, the utility uk (a) achieved by player k depends not only on
his/her own strategy ak, but also on the actual strategies chosen by all the other
players, referred to as player k’s opponents4 and denoted by \k , K \ {k}. As a
consequence, uk (a) depends on the pure-strategy profile a, whose definition can also
be restated as a =
[
ak,a\k
]
, where obviously a\k , [a1, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aK ] ∈
A\k. Hence, player k’s utility is uk (a) = uk
(
ak,a\k
)
.5
Definition 2 A game with complete information is a game in which each player
knows the game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], notably the set of players K, the set of
strategies {Ak} of each player, and the payoff functions {uk (a)} of each player.
To illustrate the concepts above introduced, it is worth resorting to a classic two-
player example, which goes by the name of Prisoner’s dilemma. The Prisoner’s
dilemma was originally framed by M. Flood and M. Dresher at RAND Corporation
in 1950. The story that currently accompanies the game, along with its name, was
4To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth emphasizing that this terminology does not mean that
the other players are trying to “beat” player k. Rather, each player’s objective is to maximize his/her
own payoff function, and this may involve “helping” or “hurting” the other players.
5In the case of mixed strategies, player’s k payoff is a polynomial function of the mixed strategies
of all players in the game [48].
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originally formalized by A. W. Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and Dresher’s idea
more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists, as follows [126]:
“Two men, charged with a joint violation of law, are held separately by
the police. Each is told that
(1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a
reward of one unit and the latter will be fined two units,
(2) if both confess, each will be fined one unit.
At the same time each has good reason to believe that
(3) if neither confesses, both will go clear.”
In this game, the number of players (the prisoners) is K = 2, and thus K =
{1, 2}. For both players, the (finite) set of allowed strategies (which implies that
the Prisoner’s dilemma is a finite game) is represented by the space A1 = A2 =
{confess, not confess}. The Prisoner’s dilemma, as well as all strategic-form games,
can conveniently be studied using the payoff matrix presented in Fig. 1.1. Prisoner
1’s actions are identified by the rows and prisoner 2’s by the columns. The pair
of numbers in the box represents the utility (u1 (a1, a2) , u2 (a1, a2)) achieved by the
players. As an example, if prisoner 1 chooses not to confess and prisoner 2 chooses to
confess, then prisoner 1 receives a payoff of −2 (representing a fine of two units) and
prisoner 2 receives the payoff +1 (representing a reward of one unit).
1.2.2 Nash equilibrium
As stated in Sect. 1.2, a game describes the constraints on the players’ actions and
interests, but does not specify the actions that the players do take [98]. Once the
game is expressed in its strategic form, it is interesting to solve it. Solving a game
means predicting the strategy each player will choose. To predict the outcome of a
static game, it is fundamental to assume that:
i) the game is of complete information, i.e., all players know the structure of the
strategic form, and know that their opponents know it, and know that their
opponents know that they know, and so on ad infinitum;
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Figure 1.1: Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s dilemma.
ii) all players are rational , i.e., they are aware of their alternatives, form expectations
about any unknowns, have clear preferences, and choose their action deliberately
after some process of optimization.
The rational behavior reflects in the fact that a rational player will not play a strictly
dominated strategy, defined as follows:
Definition 3 In the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], a strategy a′′k is
strictly dominated by strategy a′k if
uk
(
a′′k,a\k
)
< uk
(
a′k,a\k
)
, ∀a\k ∈ A\k. (1.1)
It is straightforward to understand that a rational player does not choose a strictly
dominated strategy, since the payoff achieved by playing it is always lower than that
provided by another action irrespective of the opponents’ strategies. Coming back to
the Prisoner’s dilemma in Fig. 1.1, if one prisoner is going to confess, then the other
would prefer to confess and so to receive a fine of one unit, rather than not to confess
and so to receive a fine of two units (−2 < −1). Similarly, if one prisoner is going
not to confess, then the other would prefer to confess and get a reward of one unit,
rather than not to confess and go clear (0 < 1). Thus, for prisoner k, playing “not
confess” is dominated by playing “confess” — for each strategy that the other prisoner
could choose, the payoff of prisoner k from not confessing is less than the payoff from
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confessing. As a consequence, in the Prisoner’s dilemma a rational player will choose
“confess”, so (confess, confess) will be the outcome reached by two rational players,
even though (confess, confess) results in worse payoffs for both players than would
(not confess, not confess).
More generally, the solution of a strategic-form game can be found by iteratively
eliminating strictly dominated strategies. Such method goes by the name of iterated
strict dominance [53]. Unfortunately, many if not most games of practical interest
are not solvable by iterated strict dominance. In contrast, the concept of a Nash
equilibrium solution produces much tighter predictions in a very broad class of games.
This notion captures a steady-state of the play of a strategic game in which each player
holds the correct expectation about the other players’ behavior and acts rationally.6
Definition 4 A pure-strategy profile a∗ =
[
a∗k,a
∗
\k
]
is a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], if, for all players k ∈ K,
uk
(
a∗k,a
∗
\k
)
≥ uk
(
ak,a
∗
\k
)
, ∀ak ∈ Ak, (1.2)
where a∗\k =
[
a∗1, . . . , a
∗
k−1, a
∗
k+1, . . . , a
∗
K
]
.
The definition of the Nash equilibrium can easily be extended to mixed-strategy
profiles [48]. Analogously to pure strategies, pure-strategy Nash equilibria are degen-
erated mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
The Nash equilibrium offers a stronger solution concept than iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies, in the sense that the players’ strategies in a Nash
equilibrium always survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, but
the converse is not true [53]. As an example of the first part of this statement, it is easy
to check that the solution obtained by iterated strict dominance, (confess, confess),
is a Nash equilibrium in the Prisoner’s dilemma represented in Fig. 1.1.
By inspecting Definition 4, it is clear that a Nash equilibrium represents a stable
outcome of the noncooperative game in which multiple agents (players) with (in
general) conflicting interests compete through self-optimization and reach a point
where no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate. The Nash equilibrium can
be seen from another point of view. In a noncooperative game, the strategy chosen
6It is worth stating that the concept of Nash equilibrium does not attempt to examine the process
by which a steady state is reached.
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by a rational self-optimizing player constitutes a best response to the actions chosen
by the other players. Formally, player k’s best-response function rk : A\k → Ak is
the correspondence that assigns each opponents’ profile a\k ∈ A\k the set
rk
(
a\k
)
= arg max
ak∈Ak
uk
(
ak,a\k
)
=
{
ak ∈ Ak : uk
(
ak,a\k
)
≥ uk
(
a′k,a\k
)
for all a′k ∈ Ak
}
. (1.3)
With the notion of a player’s best response, the Nash equilibrium can be restated
as follows:
Definition 5 The pure-strategy profile a∗ is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}] if and only if
a∗k ∈ rk
(
a∗\k
)
, for all k ∈ K. (1.4)
Theorem 1 (Nash, [91]) In the strategic-form game G = [K, {Ak} , {uk (a)}], if K
is finite and Ak is finite for every k (i.e., in a finite game), then there exists at least
one Nash equilibrium, possibly involving mixed strategies.
The proof makes use of the Brouwer-Kakutani fixed-point theorem and can be found
in [48, 53].
This theorem is of crucial importance in game theory, since it establishes the exis-
tence of (at least) one steady state solution for every finite game. In fact, although
characterizing the set of equilibria is in general difficult in many interesting games,
this result allows the properties of these equilibria to be studied without funding them
explicitly and without taking the risk that we are studying the empty set.
The existence of at least one (possibly mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium implies
that a strategic-form finite game may have no pure-strategy equilibria, one pure-
strategy equilibrium, or multiple pure-strategy equilibria. It is interesting to note
that Theorem 1 represents a special case of the following theorem, which considers
infinite games (i.e., games with an uncountable number of strategies) with continuous
payoffs:
Theorem 2 (Debreu, [33]; Glicksberg, [54]; Fan, [37]) Consider a game G in
strategic form, in which the pure-strategy spaces Ak are nonempty compact convex
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subsets of a Euclidean space. If the utility functions uk (a) are continuous in a and
quasi-concave7 in ak, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in G.
The proof, similar to that of Theorem 1, can be found in [48].
As can be seen in the following chapters, this result is of particular interest for the
scope of this thesis, since it establishes the existence of (at least) one pure-strategy
Nash-equilibrium in infinite strategic-form games, provided that the hypotheses of
Theorem 2 are met.
1.2.3 Pareto optimality
So far, no considerations about the efficiency of the outcome of the game have been
done. In general, there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium is a desirable outcome
for the players. Intuitively, this is motivated by the distributed approach between
the players, which could be expected to be less efficient than a possible strategy
profile obtained through cooperation between the players and/or as a result of a
centralized optimization. This is apparent in the Prisoner’s dilemma depicted in
Fig. 1.1, where the concept of Nash equilibrium leads both players to choose the
strategy pair (confess, confess), which provides a utility of −1, rather than the pair
(not confess, not confess), which yields a utility of 0. In this particular example, the
paradoxical conclusion is due to the lack of trust between the players, which is implicit
in the formulation of all noncooperative static games.
Two important concepts to investigate the efficiency of the solution(s) of strategic-
form games are the Pareto dominance and the Pareto optimality. A strategy profile
is said to be more efficient (or Pareto-dominant) if it is possible to increase the utility
of some of the players without hurting any other player. A formal definition is as
follows:
Definition 6 A strategy profile a˜ Pareto-dominates another vector a if, for all k ∈ K,
uk
(
a˜k, a˜\k
)
≥ uk
(
ak,a\k
)
, and, for some k ∈ K, uk
(
a˜k, a˜\k
)
> uk
(
ak,a\k
)
.
It is worth noting that the players might need to change their strategies simulta-
neously to reach the Pareto-dominant strategy profile a˜. Based on the concept of
Pareto dominance, it is possible to identify the most efficient strategy profile(s):
7A function uk (a) : Ak → R
1
+ defined on the convex set Ak is quasi-concave in ak if and only if
uk
 
λak + (1− λ)a
′
k ,a\k

≥ min

uk
 
ak, a\k

, uk
 
a′k, a\k
	
for all ak , a
′
k ∈ Ak and λ ∈ [0, 1].
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Definition 7 A strategy profile a˜ is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other strategy
profile a such that uk
(
ak,a\k
)
≥ uk
(
a˜k, a˜\k
)
for all k ∈ K and uk
(
ak,a\k
)
>
uk
(
a˜k, a˜\k
)
for some k ∈ K.
In other words, in a Pareto-optimal strategy profile, it is not possible to increase the
payoff of one player without decreasing that of at least one other player. Furthermore,
it can be shown in general that there exists no mixed-strategy profile that Pareto-
dominates any pure-strategy profile, because any mixed strategy of a player k is a
linear combination of his/her own pure strategies with positive coefficients that sum
up to 1 [39].
The game can have several Pareto-optimal strategy profiles and the set of these pro-
files is called the Pareto frontier . It is important to emphasize that a Pareto-optimal
strategy profile is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, a Pareto-optimal
strategy profile does not necessarily Pareto-dominate all other strategy profiles.
The Prisoner’s dilemma confirms the previous statements. In fact, it is easy to verify
that:
• the strategy profile (confess, confess) is a Nash equilibrium, but not Pareto-
optimal;
• the strategy profiles (not confess, not confess), (confess, not confess), and (not con-
fess, confess) (which constitute the Pareto frontier) are Pareto-optimal, but not
Nash equilibria;
• any Pareto-optimal strategy Pareto-dominates the Nash equilibrium, which is
said to be inefficient ;
• any Pareto-optimal strategy profile does not Pareto-dominate another Pareto-
optimal profile.
As will be better stated in the remainder of this thesis, the efficiency of the outcome
of a noncooperative game must seriously be taken into account. In fact, although
noncooperative approaches show many appealing features due to their inherent de-
centralization scheme, a significant inefficiency of their outcome(s) could make them
inapplicable to practical scenarios.
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1.3 Dynamic games
The class of static games of complete information8 presented in Sect. 1.2 considers
situations in which the players choose their actions simultaneously, without being
allowed to reconsider their plans of action after some events in the game have been
unfolded. Much of the recent interest in many fields of applications of game theory,
including wireless engineering, has been in dynamic games , i.e., situations with an
important dynamic structure. In other words, players are allowed to have a sequential
interaction, meaning that the move of one player is conditioned by the previous moves
in the game.
If at each move in the game the player with the move knows the full history of
the play of the game thus far, then the game is said to be of perfect information.
Alternatively, if the player with the move does not know the full history of the game,
the game is defined of imperfect information. This is the case of games in which
some players make simultaneous moves, thus having imperfect information about the
unfolding of the game. Static games represent a special class of dynamic games of
imperfect information with only one stage.
Dynamic games can also be classified according to whether the number of stage is
finite or infinite. In the first hypothesis, finite-horizon games are considered. In the
case of an infinite number of stages, games are said to be infinite-horizon games .
The remainder of this section briefly describes the main tools to study dynamic
problems. Since the main focus of this thesis is on static games,9 most concepts are
not thoroughly expanded.
1.3.1 Extensive-form representation
In the strategic-form representation it is usually assumed that the players make their
moves simultaneously. In the case of dynamic games, in which the players choose
their move sequentially, a more convenient representation is provided by the extensive
form. However, it is worth emphasizing that any (static or dynamic) game can be
8As already stated in Sect. 1.2, we restrict our attention to games of complete information only.
For games of incomplete information, please refer to [48, 53, 98].
9More precisely, the games discussed in this thesis are actually a special case of dynamic games.
However, as is better detailed in the following chapters, the main definitions and theoretical results
lie in the field of static games.
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represented in both strategic and extensive form, since the two representations are
completely equivalent.
Definition 8 A game in extensive form consists of:
(1) a set of players;
(2a) the order of moves – i.e., who moves when;
(2b) what the players’ choices are when they move;
(2c) what each player knows when he/she makes his/her choices;
(3) the payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that could
be chosen by the players.
In the extensive form, a finite game is represented as a tree, which is a collection of
ordered nodes. The start of the game is the root of the tree, whereas each stage of the
game is represented by one level of the tree. The player with the move is represented
as a label on the node. For infinite games, the extensive form presents graphical but
non conceptual difficulties in describing continuous action spaces. For further details
on extensive-form representation, please refer to [48, 53].
As the numbering conventions in the definitions of the strategic and extensive form
suggest, there is a close connection between a player’s feasible strategies (item 2) given
in the strategic form and the description of when a player moves, what he/she can do,
and what he/she knows (items 2a, 2b, and 2c) in the extensive form. To illustrate the
equivalence between the two representations, Fig. 1.2 reports the extensive form of
the Prisoner’s dilemma given in Fig. 1.1. The dotted line connecting the two decision
nodes represents player 2’s ignorance about player 1’s move.
To represent this kind of ignorance of previous moves in an extensive-form game, it
is worth introducing the following concept:
Definition 9 An information set for a player is a collection of decision nodes satis-
fying the following conditions:
i) the player has the move at every node in the information set; and
ii) when the play of the game reaches a node in the information set, the player with
the move does not know which node in the information set has (or has not) been
reached.
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Figure 1.2: Extensive-form representation for the Prisoner’s dilemma.
In Fig. 1.2, the dotted line indicates player 2’s information set, whose interpretation
is: when prisoner 2 gets the move, all he/she knows is that the information set has
been reached (i.e., that prisoner 1 has moved), not which node has been reached (i.e.,
what prisoner 1 did).
1.3.2 Games of perfect information
In a sequential decision-making interaction, players may or may not have a perfect
knowledge of all previous moves in the game at any moment they are with the move.
The concepts introduced in Sect. 1.3.1 are useful to formally define the concept of
perfect information for the class of games of complete information [48].
Definition 10 A dynamic game is of perfect information if every information set
is a singleton (i.e., players move one at time, and each players knows all previous
moves when making his/her decisions).
As stated in Sect. 1.3.1 for the general case of dynamic games, any finite game of
perfect information can be described by its strategic-form representation. Analogously
to static games, it is possible to use the tools presented in Sect. 1.2 to obtain the
Nash equilibria of the game. However, not every outcome of a finite game of perfect
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information can be considered “reasonable” [48]. A central issue in all dynamic games
is in fact credibility. In other words, certain Nash equilibria are strategies that can
be thought of as empty (or noncredible) threats, in that they seem not to consider the
previous history of the game and then not to choose the optimal strategy.
In dynamic games of perfect information, equilibria based on empty threats can
be eliminated using the technique of backward induction. This method is so called
because it starts by solving for the optimal choice of the last mover for each possible
situation he/she might face, and then work backwards to compute the optimal choice
for the player before.10 In other words, this technique assumes that the players can
reliably forecast the behavior of other players and that they believe that the other can
do the same. Hence, each player can compute his/her own best response. By iterating
this procedure, it is possible to derive the backward-induction outcome of the game.
Note that backward induction is similar to the technique of iterated strict dominance
in strategic-form games. However, it is worth emphasizing that this argument might
be less appealing for longer extensive-form games due to the complexity of prediction.
1.3.3 Games of imperfect information
As seen in Sect. 1.3.2, many practical situations are described by a game considered
as a sequence of stages, with the moves in all previous stages observed before the
next stage begins. However, sometimes it is interesting to allow the players to move
simultaneously in the same stage. Dynamic games of this kind are termed games
of imperfect information [53]. A subclass of these games, in which players move
simultaneously in every stage, is often referred to as the class of multi-stage games
with observed actions [48].
A more formal definition of imperfect information can be given in the case of games
of complete information as follows:
Definition 11 A dynamic game is of imperfect information if there is at least one
non-singleton information set.
Backward induction does not apply to games of imperfect information, since a non-
singleton information sets implies that at this point there are many last movers, and
10Such description is intuitive for the case of finite games with a finite horizon. Nonetheless,
backward induction can also be extended to games with infinite horizon and to infinite games by
using the analysis provided in [48].
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each of them must know the moves of the others to compute his/her own optimal
choice (best response). In other words, the presence of a simultaneous-move stage
involves solving a real game rather than solving a single-person optimization problem
as in Sect. 1.3.2.
This impairment is somewhat analogous to that of static games that cannot be
solved by iterated strict dominance. A way out of this impasse is offered by the tools
described in Sect. 1.3.4.
1.3.4 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
Seminal contributions to the study of dynamic games of complete information were
given by Selten, who overcame the difficulties described in Sect. 1.3.3 by introducing
the concepts of subgame perfection and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. More
specifically, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium extends the idea of backward in-
duction to extensive games where players move simultaneously in several periods [113].
A key role for this formulation is played by the concept of proper subgame, defined
as follows:
Definition 12 The game G′ is a proper subgame of an extensive-form game (with
both perfect and imperfect information) if:
i) G′ begins at a decision node n that is a singleton information set;
ii) G′ includes all the decision and the terminal nodes following node n in the game
tree (but no nodes that do not follow node n); and
iii) G′ does not cut any information sets.
Thorough motivations for defining proper subgames can be found in [48, 53]. For
the scope of this thesis, it suffices to mention that the conditions above mentioned
guarantee that, in a proper subgame G′, the complete history of the game thus far
is common knowledge between all the players. It is easy to verify that there are no
proper subgames in any simultaneous-move (including static) games.
Given the general definition of a proper subgame, it is possible to formally define
the concept of subgame perfection. This definition reduces to backward induction in
finite games with perfect information.
1.3 Dynamic games 23
Definition 13 (Selten, [113]) A (mixed-strategy) profile a is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form game G if it is a Nash equilibrium of any
proper subgame G′ of the original game G.
It is immediate to show (by construction) that any finite game of complete informa-
tion has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, perhaps in mixed strategies [53]. In the
case of finite games of complete and perfect information, it is possible to prove that
there exists (at least) one pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium [72,98].
Because any proper subgame is a game itself, a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is
necessarily a Nash equilibrium. In other words, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are
a subset of Nash equilibria. The importance of the concept of subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium lies in its capability of eliminating Nash equilibria that rely on empty
threats.
Furthermore, a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium represents a collection of strate-
gies (a complete plan of action) for each player in response to any possible unfolding
of the game. Nevertheless, subgame perfection has been often criticized, mostly with
arguments based on equilibrium selection [48].
1.3.5 Repeated games
Repeated games represent a subclass of dynamic games, in which the players face the
same single-stage (static) game in every period. Repeated games can be classified
according to the time horizon. If the time horizon is finite, the games are said to be
finite-horizon or, equivalently, finitely repeated games. Similarly, if the time horizon
is infinite, the games are termed infinite-horizon or, equivalently, infinitely repeated
games.
In some cases, the objective of the players in a repeated game can be to maximize
their own payoffs only for the next stage (i.e., as if they played a static game). These
games are referred to as myopic games , as the players are short-sighted optimizers.
Alternatively, in some situations the player’s payoff is a weighted average of the payoffs
in each stage. These games constitute the class of long-sighted games .
In both cases, the players’ actions are observed at the end of each stage. This
involves the concepts of “reputation” and “punishment” between the players in the
game [76]. In fact, when players participate in repeated interactions, they must
consider the effects that their chosen strategies in any stage of the game may have on
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opponents’ strategies in subsequent rounds. As a consequence, it becomes possible
for the players to condition their play on the past play of their opponents, which can
lead to equilibrium outcomes that do not arise when the game is played only once
(i.e., when the game is static). As a conclusion, the repeated interaction between the
players may induce a sort of “cooperation” between them [98].
When considering long-sighted games (with both finite and infinite time horizon),
the concept of discount factor is of particular interest, since it allows the decrease
of the value for future payoffs to be described mathematically. In the economic
context, the discount factor represents the ratio between the present value of an
amount of money and the amount of money received one stage later and is related to
the positive interest rate per stage. This formulation is also applicable to the wireless
and networking context, since terminals in a network want to exchange information
as soon as possible. A fundamental result in this context is provided by the so-called
folk theorems [47, 98].
1.4 Game theory in wireless networks
As stated in Sect. 1.1, game theory has been profitably applied to wireless networks
since the mid-1990s. To exploit the analytical tools of game theory, the abstract
concepts introduced in the previous sections should be properly adapted to wireless
networks. Sect. 1.4.1 contains some toy examples that are expedient to understand
how a simplified power control problem can be modeled as a noncooperative game [13].
Sect. 1.4.2 provides a brief overview of current research in the field of power control
for wireless networks based on the noncooperative game-theoretic framework [82].
1.4.1 Motivating examples
To illustrate the intuitive meaning of these concepts, we consider a trivial example of
a static noncooperative game, called the near-far effect game. Two wireless terminals
(player 1 and player 2) transmit to a certain access point (AP) in a code division
multiple access (CDMA) network. Player 1 is located close to the AP, whilst player
2 is much farther away, as is depicted in Fig. 1.3. Hence, K = 2 and K = {1, 2}.
Each user is allowed either to transmit at a certain power level pk = p, or to wait
(pk = 0). This translates into Ak = Pk = {0, p}. Each terminal achieves a degree
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player 1
player 2
AP
Figure 1.3: The network scenario in the near-far effect game.
of satisfaction which depends on the outcome of the transmission and on the cost
due to the energy spent for transmitting at power pk. Mathematically, this translates
into an adimensional utility uk (a) = uk (p1, p2) = tk − zk, where tk = 1 if the
transmission is successful and tk = 0 otherwise; also, the cost is zk = z ≪ 1 if
the player chooses to transmit, and zk = 0 otherwise. Due to the near-far effect,
sketched in Fig. 1.3, whenever the near player (player 1) chooses to transmit, his/her
transmission is successful irrespective of the action of the far player (player 2). In
particular, if p1 = p, player 1 can deliver his/her information, thus receiving a utility
u1 (p, p2) = 1 − z (irrespective of p2). If p1 = 0 (player 1 is idle), his/her utility is
u1 (0, p2) = 0 (irrespective of p2 again). Let us now focus on player 2. Because of the
interference caused by player 1, player 2 transmits successfully only when player 1 is
idle (p1 = 0). In this case, u2 (0, p) = 1 − z. If both players play pk = p, due to the
near-far effect, player 2’s transmission fails and u2 (p, p) = −z. Similarly to player 1,
u2 (p1, 0) = 0 when player 2 is idle.
The near-far effect game is summarized in the strategic-form matrix depicted in
Fig. 1.4. By inspecting the payoff matrix, it is apparent that player 1’s best strategy
is represented by p1 = p whatever p2 is, since 1− z > 0 under the assumption z ≪ 1.
This is known to player 2 as well. Hence, to “limit damage”, he/she rationally chooses
to play p2 = 0. As a conclusion, the near-far effect game has only one pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, represented by the strategy a = (p, 0) (the same conclusion follows
from Definition 4).
By applying Definition 7, this game can be shown to have two Pareto-optimal
solutions, namely (p, 0) and (0, p). Hence, the (only) pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is also Pareto-optimal. However, our solution (p, 0) is highly unsatisfactory for player
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Figure 1.4: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game.
2 since he/she does not show to convey any information to the AP. We take this
apparent need for fairness as our motivation to introduce power control.
Let us provide our near-far effect game with a naive form of power control . Assume
now that each terminal is allowed to transmit choosing between two different levels of
transmit power: either a certain amount p, or a reduced level ηp, where η, 0 < η < 1.
The power control factor η is such that the received power for both players is the same
when the far player uses p and the near player uses ηp. Hence, Ak = Pk = {ηp, p}.
Similarly to the previous game with no power control, uk (p1, p2) = tk − zk, where
tk = 1 if the transmission for player k is successful, and tk = 0 otherwise, and where
zk is proportional to the consumed energy, i.e., zk = z if pk = p, and zk = ηz if
pk = ηp. As before, due to the near-far effect, player 1 can successfully transmit
irrespective of p2, whereas player 2 can correctly reach the receiver only if p2 > p1.
The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Fig. 1.5. Since 1− ηz > 1− z, player 1’s
best strategy is p1 = ηp. Consequently, player 2 plays p2 = p. This game has thus
one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is also the only Pareto-optimal solution.
This power control technique seems to compensate for the near-far effect, since
both players are now able to transmit. However, this scenario does not actually
model real data networks. The main inaccuracy lies in the over-simplified utility
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Figure 1.5: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game with power control and zero-one
utility.
function. Our “go/no-go” utility is suitable only for those applications for which the
acceptable quality of a connection is specified by a maximum tolerable bit error rate
(BER), which turns into a minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
requirement. This is the typical case for voice networks, in which the voice user is
usually indifferent to small changes in its SINR [55]. In a data network, higher SINRs
lead to a larger amount of transmitted information. This implies that the utility for
a data terminal is a continuous function of its SINR. To account for this different
point of view, the term tk should be a function of the amount of information that is
actually delivered to the receiver. Focusing on player 1, if p1 = p, the (normalized)
amount of information (we may call it the throughput) is equal to t1 = t ≫ z. If
player 1 uses a lower power p1 = ηp, then t1 = λt, with η < λ . 1.11 Considering
player 2, t2 = 0 if p2 ≤ p1, and t2 = λt if p2 > p1, since the received power for player
2 is equal to that of player 1 with p1 = ηp.
The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Fig. 1.6. Similarly to the near-far
effect game without power control, player 1’s best strategy is represented by p1 = p
11Note that η < λ in all practical scenarios, since the performance in terms of correct detection
does not show a linear dependence on the transmit power.
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Figure 1.6: Payoff matrix for the near-far effect game with power control and variable
throughput.
whatever p2 is, since t− z > λt − ηz under the assumption t ≫ z. As a consequence,
player 2 rationally chooses to play p2 = ηp. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is
represented by the strategy (p, ηp), whereas the Pareto-optimal solutions are (p, ηp)
and (ηp, p). We appear to be back to the original situation we had without power
control, since at the Nash equilibrium player 2 is unable to transmit.
The inefficiency of this scheme can be measured in terms of social optimality. Al-
though formally different from the Pareto-optimal solution, the social-optimal solution
is strongly connected with the efficiency of a certain strategy in terms of the overall
performance of the network. In other words, the social-optimal solution provides a
measure of the maximal revenue of the network as a whole assuming that the terminals
act according to a cooperative scheme rather than choose their action selfishly. As
can be seen in the next chapters, we will use this notion to measure the inefficiency
of the outcome of distributed schemes. In the specific case of the near-far effect
game with variable throughput, a solution is socially optimal if the overall utility
unetwork (p1, p2) = u1 (p1, p2)+ u2 (p1, p2) is a maximum. We see that (p, ηp), in spite
of being Pareto-optimal, does not represent the best solution for the network as a
whole, since the overall utility is unetwork (p, ηp) = t − (1 + η) z < 2λt − (1 + η) z =
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unetwork (ηp, p). Hence, the Nash equilibrium is not desirable in a social sense.
We can make this situation considerably better by resorting to a dynamic game.
It is easy to see that (p, ηp) is the best strategy for player 1 in a one-move (static)
game only. If the near-far effect game of Fig. 1.6 is played with several moves, player
1 will choose the strategy p1 = ηp. To see the motivation for this, assume that 1/λ
is an integer for the sake of simplicity (the same conclusions hold even when such
assumption is not verified). If the players play (ηp, p) for 1/λ times, player 1 achieves
a total utility (λt − ηz) /λ = t − ηz/λ, which is greater than t − z due to η < λ.
The only disadvantage is an increased transmission time, which is not necessarily
a negative feature (it actually is only for delay-sensitive applications, which call for
different utility functions).
1.4.2 Applications to power control
In the last two decades, game theory has been extensively applied to many resource
allocation issues, that span all the layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI)
reference stack [68]. Since this thesis is mainly focused on power control techniques,
this subsection will provide an overview of the relevant noncooperative game-theoretic
approaches to power control in the context of wireless communication networks. The
interested reader may refer to [8,38,65,76,96,107,116] for a survey on game-theoretic
approaches in other resource allocation issues.
The need for power control in wireless communications emerged since the pioneering
works on spread spectrum (SS) satellite communications [1, 86]. Until mid-1990s,
power control techniques were primarily focused on voice communications systems [46,
58,95,140]. For these applications, SINR-balancing schemes are particularly suitable,
since voice users are usually indifferent to small changes in their SINRs.
With the advent of the third-generation cellular networks, high-speed data services
became available to the mobile population. Since data communications are intolerant
of errors, higher SINRs lead to a lesser number of retransmissions, which translates
into a larger amount of information correctly delivered at the receiver. As a conse-
quence, the level of satisfaction achieved by each user becomes a continuous function
of the SINR [55].
Noncooperative game theory has shown to be particularly suitable to address the
problem of power allocation for wireless data networks. The game-theoretic frame-
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work was originally proposed in the context of voice traffic in 1998 by Ji and Huang
in [69], in which the mobile terminals in a cellular network competing for the uplink
channels are modeled as noncooperative players in a strategic-form game.
In [36, 114], Shah et al. extended this framework to data traffic, formulating an
effective utility function to focus power control on the energy efficiency of the terminal.
To properly capture the tradeoff between achieving a satisfactory QoS and prolonging
battery life, the utility of each user is measured as the ratio of its throughput to its
transmit power in the uplink of a CDMA infrastructure network using matched filter
receivers. In other terms, this utility function measures the number of bits than can
be correctly delivered at the receiver per joule of energy consumed. Using Yates’
standard power control framework [137], the Nash equilibrium is shown to be reached
when all the terminals achieve the same SINR target. However, although the proposed
game-theoretic algorithm mimics a SINR-balancing power control scheme, the SINR
target is chosen accordingly to the tradeoff between throughput and transmit power.
In [114], Shah et al. also proposed linear pricing techniques to improve the efficiency
of the Nash equilibrium in terms of Pareto optimality. The formal proof of the
convergence of the algorithm is provided by Saraydar et al. in [110], in which the
properties of supermodular games [6,123,124] are applied to the power control game
with pricing. This approach is extended by Hayajneh and Abdallah in [63] to arbitrary
channels using statistical learning theory.
A different method to improve the Pareto efficiency of the Nash equilibrium is derived
by Goodman and Mandayam in [56,57]. A network-assisted power control algorithm
is proposed, in which the SINR target is chosen by a central controller (typically,
the base station) and broadcast to all users in the network. (A similar approach is
proposed by MacKenzie and Wicker in [77], in which a repeated power control game
is also derived.)
In the schemes described above, the main focus in on single-cell networks. In [109],
Saraydar et al. extended the framework by Shah et al. to the case of a multi-cell
network, proving the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the power
control scheme and the convergence of the iterative algorithm. The energy-efficient
approach to power control for infrastructure networks has been extended by Meshkati
et al. in [79] to multicarrier CDMA systems.
A different pricing technique is employed by Feng et al. [40] to study the performance
of distributed (noncooperative) algorithms with respect to a centralized (cooperative)
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framework. While previous pricing schemes were based on transmit powers, here the
pricing is based on throughputs to serve as a mediator between the user-centric and the
network-centric approach. The algorithm is derived by using a Stackelberg (dynamic)
game. This method is extended to multi-cell systems in [41].
The energy efficiency framework is also suitable to derive distributed schemes for
infrastructure networks to jointly address power control and other aspects of the
network design. In [85], Meshkati et al. studied the cross-layer design of joint power
control and linear multiuser detection, showing that the transmit powers of the users
are SINR-balanced at the Nash equilibrium. This approach is further generalized
in [81] to a broader class of receivers, including nonlinear receivers (see also [24]).
(Although with a layered approach, the effect of successive interference cancellation
was studied also by St Jean and Jabbari in [117].)
The approach outlined in [85] is extended by Buzzi et al. in [22] considering the effects
of distortion due to multipath propagation. In [23], the spreading code optimization
is added to the joint power control and receiver design, also proposing a stochastic
algorithm to the noncooperative game and extending the results to multi-cell systems
[25, 26].
Another cross-layer approach using the energy-efficient formulation is proposed by
Meshkati et al. in [83,84] by considering QoS delay requirements in CDMA networks.
The effects of modulation on energy efficiency have been analyzed in [80].
The game-theoretic formulation proposed in [114] for CDMA infrastructure networks
is also suitable to study the performance of ad hoc networks. In [67], Ileri et al. studied
a cross-layer design of power control and forwarding in a multihop ad hoc network
using a Stackelberg model with pricing based on channel use and reimbursement for
forwarding. In [20], Betz and Poor extended the results of joint power control and
receiver design in [85] to multihop ad hoc networks.
In [133, 134], Xiao et al. reformulated the problem of distributed power control
by proposing a utility-based scheme. The major criticisms to the energy efficiency
framework outlined in [109, 110, 114] lie in the possible divergence of the energy-
efficient algorithm in the absence of tight bounds for the transmit powers and the
complexity of the updating mechanism. To address these problems, Xiao et al. focused
on the downlink channel of a wireless data networks. In this scenario, they proposed
an iterative algorithm to reach a Nash equilibrium of a static game (using [137] for
the convergence) in which the player aim at maximizing the difference between a
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utility function and a pricing function. Using concepts from the theory of neural
networks, the proposed utility is a sigmoidal-shape function. It is worth stating
that this function, although presenting some desirable properties, such as inherent
admission control and convergence of the algorithm, is not related to any physical
quantity, and thus a proper tuning of the algorithm is required.
The utility-based framework, originally developed for infrastructure networks, can
be extended to ad hoc networks as well. In [43], Fittipaldi and Luise adopted the
sigmoidal utility function to model the power control scheme of an ad hoc network,
also proposing an alternative approach in which the SINR is replaced by the Shannon
capacity to increase the average number of active links. In [66], Huang and Letaief
used utility-based framework [134] to study the cross-layer problem of scheduling and
power control for wireless single-hop ad-hoc networks.
In [122], Sung and Wang proposed a capacity-maximizing approach to the game-
theoretic power control for wireless data CDMA networks. The objective of the
distributed scheme is maximizing the difference between the Shannon capacity and a
pricing function. Similarly to [114], pricing is introduced to improve the Pareto effi-
ciency of the Nash solution, although the pricing parameter is normalized accordingly
to the total interference at the base station and broadcast by the system. The Nash
equilibrium of the proposed static game is achieved through an iterative algorithm
(using [137] for the convergence) in the general case of users with different data rates.
A similar approach is described by Alpcan et al. in [5] for the uplink power control in
a single-cell CDMA wireless network. The proposed static game aims at maximizing
the difference between the Shannon capacity, properly scaled by a user-specific param-
eter, and the pricing function. Alpcan et al. proposed two different pricing strategies,
namely the centralized scheme (with admission control), and the distributed (market-
based) scheme. The convergence of the algorithm is studied in both the synchronous
and asynchronous update mechanism. This framework is extended to a multi-cell
system in [3], also using a broader class of pricing functions.
The results presented in [5] have been extended by Gunturi and Paganini in [59], in
which maximum power constraints on the users are taken into account. The multi-
cell scenario is also considered. A similar approach is used by Altman et al. in [7],
in which a discrete power control for the uplink of a wireless network is studied.
The distributed framework (suitable also for ad hoc and sensor networks) considers a
discrete set of available power levels, including a limit on the average power. In [78],
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Maille´ considered the utility as the difference between Shannon capacity and pricing
to address the problem of downlink power control in CDMA wireless networks with
a variable number of users. The solution of this problem is obtained by resorting to
an auction-based game.
In [4], Alpcan et al. modified the utility function to consider the outage probability
of the system. The convergence of the algorithm is verified also in the case of a
stochastic version of the update scheme to take into account the effects of estimation
and quantization errors. In [64], Hayajneh and Abdallah used a capacity-maximizing
criterion to address the problem of joint rate and power control for infrastructure
networks. The game-theoretic algorithm is decoupled in a rate control game and a
subsequent power control game. A similar approach is considered by Yuan et al. in
[138], in which the power control represents a subproblem of a cross-layer optimization
in the context of wireless mesh networks.
In [99], Palomar et al. studied the game-theoretic power allocation in multiple input
multiple output (MIMO) systems. In this context, the utility function is represented
by the mutual information, and several types of games are considered, namely pure-
and mixed-strategy static games and Stackelberg (dynamic) games. In the case of
unavailable statistics of the channels, the game-theoretic approach leads to a uniform
power allocation, which is shown to be a robust solution of the problem. In [75], Liang
and Dandekar extended this framework to MIMO ad hoc networks by modeling the
power allocation in each link as a noncooperative game.
In [10], Baccarelli et al. used the game-theoretic framework to study the distributed
joint power allocation and signal shaping in a MIMO ad hoc network. The strategies
of the transmit/receive units are the covariance matrices, while the utility function
is the conditional throughput. In [29], Chen et al. studied the uplink power control
for a cellular MIMO system. Game theory is used to derive an iterative algorithm
for adaptive power allocation, whose convergence is verified through simulations. The
outcome of the iterative update scheme is compared with iterative waterfilling.
Opportunistic power allocation modeled as a noncooperative game is considered by
Sun and Modiano in [119] for infrastructure wireless networks. The objective of the
power allocation scheme is to maximize the throughput subject to a maximum average
amount of consumed energy. This is achieved by selecting power levels that maximize
the probability of successful reception based on the channel state. In [74], Leung and
Sung considered an opportunistic game-theoretic algorithm for multi-cell networks.
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The proposed utility is the difference between the square root of the SINR and a linear
pricing function. The convergence of the algorithm is shown using the framework by
Sung and Leung [120], also considering the simultaneous presence of SINR-balancing
and opportunistic terminals in the network. The stability of the update scheme is
verified even in the case of a soft handoff. The decentralization of the algorithm allows
this approach to be applicable to ad hoc networks as well.
In [121], Sung and Leung studied the problem of joint distributed power and sig-
nature sequence control for CDMA systems. In particular, the conditions to ensure
the existence of Nash equilibria are derived, and the Nash solution is obtained by
separating the joint problem into two subproblems, namely sequence adaptation and
power control. The solution of the joint power control and sequence adaptation
problem is completely characterized in the case of synchronous single-cell system,
whereas the multi-cell scenario remains unsolved.
In [60], Han and Liu analyzed the joint problem of power and rate allocation for an
infrastructure wireless network. The joint allocation scheme is performed by means
of two interrelated games, namely the power control at the user level, and the rate
control at the system level.
Finally, a different approach to power control for infrastructure wireless networks
(in both uplink and downlink) is considered by Koskie and Gajic in [71]. The major
criticisms to the SINR-balancing schemes, such as the Foschini-Miljanic algorithm [46]
and those resulting from the energy efficient approach derived in [110,114], lie in the
high power consumption required to achieve the SINR target and slow convergence
of the algorithm. To reduce power levels while preserving an acceptable QoS, the
proposed utility is proportional to the transmit power and the difference between
achieved SINR and target SINR. The convergence of the distributed algorithm is
ensured by Yates’ framework.
Chapter 2
The ultrawideband network
scenario
This chapter describes the system model considered throughout this thesis. After
introducing the key points of UWB wireless networks in Sect. 2.1, Sect. 2.2 provides
an analytical characterization of transmitter side, channel model, and receiver side,
respectively. Finally, Sect. 2.3 motivates the use of power control techniques to
improve the performance of this kind of networks.
2.1 Introduction
The increasing demand for reliable high-speed data services in wireless networks has
generated a number of new technologies that provide multiple access capability with
efficient resource allocation and possibly interference mitigation. UWB communica-
tion has emerged as a possible solution to satisfy these market drivers. As its name
suggests, this technique makes use of extremely wide radio-frequency bandwidths
to offer a wealth of attractive features for wireless communications, as well as for
networking, radar, imaging and positioning systems [51, 88, 108, 136]. UWB has a
history as old as wireless itself, as the pioneering work on wireless telegraphy of
Guglielmo Marconi made use of spark-gap transmission devices [103, 136]. The first
applications of “modern” UWB technology dates back to the late 1960s [17], when
UWB radars were introduced in military applications, whilst UWB for commercial
wireless communications gained prominence with the groundbreaking work on impulse
radio (IR) by Win and Scholtz in the 1990s [111, 131, 132]. The final clearance of
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UWB technology for commercial applications was ratified with the first rulemaking
proposal in 2002, when the United States (US) frequency regulator, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), allowed unlicensed UWB operation [31]. Currently,
similar regulatory processes are under way in many other countries worldwide: for
instance, Japan and Korea have already approved a preliminary emission policy [100],
whereas in Europe, the Electronic Communications Committee (ECC) TG3 officially
authorized the use of UWB technology in 2007 [97]. At present, UWB is spreading in
the world of information technologies in two competing de-facto standards, either for
wireless personal area networks (WPANs), or for high-speed connection of computer
peripherals to main units – the so-called wireless universal serial bus (USB).
The physical layer of IR-UWB systems is based on the transmission of low-power
ultra-short information-bearing pulses (commonly referred to as monocycles). This
approach brings forth a number of distinctive features such as:
i) significant multiuser capability, due to the large bandwidth spreading factor;
ii) potential for extremely high data rates, thanks to the wide transmission band-
width;
iii) enhanced capability to penetrate through obstacles, due to the concurrent pres-
ence of energy over a wide range of different frequencies;
iv) coexistence with incumbent systems in the same frequency bands, because of its
low power spectral density; and
v) potential for small-size and low-powered mobile terminals, due to the small
processing power required.
The list above represents the main motivations that led to the development of UWB
technology as an access scheme for innovative high-speed data networks [27, 50, 89,
103]. However, the appealing features of UWB technology are not enough per se to
comply with the current ever-increasing demand for larger network capacity. In the
near future, wireless networks are expected to support a variety of applications with
different QoS constraints. In addition, efficient resource allocation at the transmitter
side is mandatory in any instances, due to the presence of mobile, battery-powered
terminals. The goal of the system designer is thus to design wireless networks that
use the available resources (namely, bandwidth and energy) as efficiently as possible,
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while satisfying the QoS requirements of the users. Although a layered approach
based on the OSI model is very successful for designing wired systems [34], this has
proven to be quite inefficient for wireless networks [82]. This is especially true for
large, dynamic networks with variable, possibly mobile nodes, whose control must be
as adaptive and scalable as possible. The natural consequence is that the network
design must follow a cross-layer approach that involves optimization and performance
evaluation of both the physical and the data-link layer, as has been briefly sketched
in Sect. 1.4.2.
2.2 System outline
UWB systems include all bandpass transmitting schemes with either large relative
bandwidth (typically, larger than 20%), and all baseband systems with large absolute
bandwidth (typically, larger than 500 MHz). To allow unlicensed operation over such
wide ranges, radiation emissions must respect strict frequency regulations not to affect
the performance of incumbent (possibly licensed) systems. Those “frequency masks”
depend on the application and on the environment in which the devices operate.
As an example of the outputs of regulatory processes, Fig. 2.1 shows the spectral
mask issued by the US FCC for indoor communications (solid line) in terms of
equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP) [31]. As can be seen, a power spectral
density (PSD) of −41.3 dBm/MHz is allowed in the frequency band between 3.1
and 10.6 GHz. Outside of that band, no intentional emissions are allowed, and the
admissible PSD for spurious emissions provides special protection for global position-
ing system (GPS) and cellular services. The dashed line shows the spectral mask as
specified in the European Union (EU) [97]. As can be noticed, current EU regulations
are stricter than those provided by the FCC.1
2.2.1 Transmitter side
Several technologies to implement UWB fulfill the regulations [31] and [97]. Depend-
ing on the spreading codes employed, these systems are termed time hopping (TH)-
UWB [111], direct-sequence (DS)-UWB [44], or baseband single-carrier/multicarrier
1Fig. 2.1 reports the EU indoor spectral mask valid until the end of 2010. After 2010, the
maximum EU EIRP emission levels in certain bandwidths will be even lower [97].
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Figure 2.1: UWB spectral mask for indoor commercial systems.
(SC/MC)-UWB [130,135], just to mention a few.
In this work, we will focus on TH systems, where the multiple access is performed
by using a pseudo-random TH sequence for each user. The information is conveyed
by either the position or the polarity of an ultrashort pulse, which correspond to pulse
position modulation (PPM) and binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), respectively. Each
pulse is called a “monocycle” and has a basic shape given by the time-derivative of
a Gaussian waveform. In “classical” IR, the polarity of the monocycle is always
the same [73, 132]. Alternatively, here we will consider polarity randomization [89]
which reduces the multiple access interference (MAI) and optimizes the spectral shape
according to FCC/ECC specifications. With this technique, each monocycle has a
random polarity code in addition to data modulation.
Throughout our analysis, we consider the uplink of an infrastructure BPSK ran-
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domized TH-IR system with K users sharing the same channel to communicate with
a common AP. The transmitted signal from user k is [50]
s
(k)
tx (t) =
√
pkTf
N
+∞∑
n=−∞
d(k)n b
(k)
⌊n/Nf ⌋wtx(t− nTf − c
(k)
n Tc), (2.1)
where:
• wtx(t) is the unit-energy UWB pulse, whose duration Tc is on the order of tens
or hundreds of nanoseconds;
• pk is the transmit power of user k, whose maximum value is determined accord-
ing to PSD regulations;
• Tf is the period of a frame, and Nf is the number of frames per bit period Tb
(Tb = NfTf);
• Nc is the number of slots into which each frame is partitioned, representing the
Nc possible positions of a pulse; the width of each time slot is Tc;
• as a consequence, N = Nc · Nf is the total spreading factor inherent in UWB
signaling;
• the operator ⌊·⌋ indicates the integer part of its argument, so that ⌊n/Nf⌋
represents the time index of each data bit;
• b
(k)
⌊n/Nf ⌋ ∈ {−1,+1} is the information symbol transmitted by user k;
• dk =
{
d
(k)
0 , · · · , d
(k)
Nf−1
}
is the polarity code, where d
(k)
n ∈ ±1 with probability
1/2; and
• ck =
{
c
(k)
1 , · · · , c
(k)
Nf
}
is the TH sequence, where c
(k)
n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , Nc − 1} with
equal probability.
Fig. 2.2 illustrates a sample TH-IR signal as in (2.1), which conveys a single informa-
tion symbol ‘+1’. In this simple example, we use Nf = 3 frames (thus corresponding
to sending three monocycles for each information symbol) and Nc = Tf/Tc = 5
possible pulse positions. Hence, the spreading factor is N = Nf · Nc = 15. As can
be seen, the TH sequence is {1, 3, 0}, whereas the polarity code is {+1,−1,−1}. In
practical systems, the numbers Nf and Nc are much larger.
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Figure 2.2: Example of TH-IR signal with pulse-based polarity randomization.
It is also of interest to highlight the relationship between our (randomized) IR-
UWB and traditional random-CDMA (RCDMA) , that is, DS/SS signaling with long
pseudo-random spreading codes. To this end, we introduce the ternary sequence
s(k) = {s
(k)
n }, defined as
s(k)n =

d
(k)
⌊n/Nc⌋, c
(k)
⌊n/Nc⌋·Nc = n− ⌊n/Nc⌋ ·Nc,
0, otherwise;
(2.2)
which can cast (2.1) into
s
(k)
tx (t) =
√
pkTf
N
+∞∑
n=−∞
s(k)n b
(k)
⌊n/N⌋wtx(t− nTc). (2.3)
Definition (2.2) is a formally correct but complicated way to state that the “chips”
of the spreading sequence s
(k)
n are 0 when no pulse is sent in the corresponding slot,
and is equal to the pulse polarity (±1) when the pulse is active. The resemblance with
RCDMA is apparent. The main difference is that the spreading sequence is ternary
rather than binary as in conventional DS/SS. Also, the binary chips of traditional
spreading codes for DS/SS are approximately delta-correlated, while the values of the
sequence s
(k)
n have a correlation pattern dictated by the TH sequence. We have strict
coincidence of IR-UWB and DS/SS only when Nc = 1 (no TH).
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2.2.2 Channel model
Due to their extremely large bandwidths, UWB signals have a much higher temporal
resolution than conventional narrowband or wideband signals. As a consequence, the
multipath channel experienced by such signals is extremely “rich”, i.e., crowded with
hundreds of resolvable propagation paths in an indoor environment. Our channel
model is a conventional tapped-delay line [52, 104]:
πk(t) =
L∑
l=1
α
(k)
l δ(t− (l − 1)Tc − τk), (2.4)
where L is the number of channel paths, and αk = [α
(k)
1 , . . . , α
(k)
L ]
T are the fading
coefficients. Our model also captures the different overall propagation delay τk of user
k, that we suppose for simplicity to be an integer multiple of Tc: τk = ∆kTc, for every
k, where ∆k is uniformly distributed in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. We also assume that the
channel characteristics remain unchanged over several symbol intervals [50].
2.2.3 Receiver side
Especially in indoor environments, multipath channels can have hundreds of multipath
components due to the high resolution of UWB signals. In such cases, linear receivers
such as matched filters (MFs), pulse-discarding receivers [42], and multiuser detectors
(MUDs) [127] cannot provide good performance, since more collisions will occur
through multipath components. To mitigate the effects of multipath, we consider an
AP that uses K Rake receivers [102].2 The Rake receiver for user k is characterized
by the L coefficients collected into the vector βk = G ·αk = [β
(k)
1 , . . . , β
(k)
L ]
T , which
represent the combining weights for user k, and where the L × L matrix G depends
on the type of Rake receiver employed. In particular, if G is a deterministic diagonal
matrix, where
{G}ll =

1, 1 ≤ l ≤ r · L,0, elsewhere, (2.5)
with r , LP /L and 0 < LP ≤ L, then this receiver is a partial Rake (PRake) with LP
fingers using maximal ratio combining (MRC). Note that, when r = 1, this receiver
2Since the focus of this thesis is on the interplay between power control and Rake receivers, perfect
channel estimation is considered throughout the paper for ease of calculation.
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becomes an all-Rake (ARake).
The SINR of the kth user at the output of the Rake receiver can be well approximated
(for large Nf , typically, at least 5) by [50]
γk =
h
(SP)
k pk
h
(SI)
k pk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
, (2.6)
where σ2 is the output variance due to ambient additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN);
h
(SP)
k is the term due to the signal part (SP); h
(SI)
k is the term due to the self-
interference (SI), i.e., the effect of the cross-term that arises between the output of
the propagation path α
(k)
l and the m-th Rake coefficient β
(k)
m , m 6= l; and h
(MAI)
kj is
the term due to the MAI of user j 6= k. These terms are expressed by [15, 50]
h
(SP)
k = β
H
k ·αk, (2.7)
h
(SI)
k =
1
N
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2
βHk ·αk
, (2.8)
h
(MAI)
kj =
1
N
∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣βHk ·αj∣∣∣2
βHk ·αk
, (2.9)
respectively, where the matrices
Ak =


α
(k)
L · · · · · · α
(k)
2
0 α
(k)
L · · · α
(k)
3
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 α
(k)
L
0 · · · · · · 0


, (2.10)
Bk =


β
(k)
L · · · · · · β
(k)
2
0 β
(k)
L · · · β
(k)
3
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 β
(k)
L
0 · · · · · · 0


, (2.11)
Φ = diag {φ1, . . . , φL−1} , (2.12)
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with
φl =
√
min{L− l, Nc}
Nc
, (2.13)
have been introduced for convenience of notation.
2.3 The need for power control techniques
Equation (2.6) is our starting point to motivate the need for resource allocation, in
general, and for power control, in particular. Assume first that we have no multipath.
The term h
(SI)
k pk disappears, and the SINR appears to improve. However, we still
an MAI amount that is proportional to the interferers’ power pj, j 6= k. This is the
classical scenario of CDMA, and the conclusions are pretty much the same [55,79,85,
109].
In the presence of the term h
(SI)
k (i.e., in a frequency-selective scenario), the SI
impacts system performance as well. In fact, pk does appear not only in the numerator
of (2.6), but also in the denominator, owing to the presence of multiple paths. Hence,
the problem of an efficient resource allocation scheme becomes more challenging than
in the case of a non-dispersive channel. To design scalable and reduced-complexity
power control schemes, it is desirable to use distributed algorithms, which have many
advantages. Just to mention a few, such algorithms do not present any limitations
in terms of the network size, as they allow each terminal to choose its own transmit
power via a linear relationship (centralized schemes are typically described by NP-
hard problems); moreover, they reduce the resources needed for a return link,3 since
no centralized control is involved. A viable method for devising distributed power
control algorithms is provided by game theory, as has been outlined in Sect. 1.4.
3An exchange of information between the user and the AP is demanded in distributed algorithms
as well, yet the amount of communications is minimal.
Chapter 3
Game-theoretic power control
This thesis is specifically focused on the problem of power control, which is a key
issue in data wireless networks based on wideband physical layer technologies, such
as UWB and direct-sequence (DS) CDMA (here abbreviated CDMA). As seen in
Sect. 2.2.1, a wideband wireless network based on CDMA can be seen as a special
case of a network using UWB as the multiple access technique. As a consequence, it
is possible to focus our analysis on multiuser UWB networks. The CDMA case will
be detailed in Chapter 6, in which the two access schemes are compared in terms of
achieved performance.
Sect. 3.1 illustrates the main reasons that motivate us to devise a distributed power
control scheme in the context of wireless data networks using UWB as the multiple
access technology. The game-theoretic formulation of the distributed power control
problem is provided in Sect. 3.2. The noncooperative power control game is formally
discussed in Sect. 3.3, in which the existence and the uniqueness of a pure-strategy
Nash solution are shown by means of the analytical tools of game theory. Finally,
Sect. 3.4 describes an iterative algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium in a distributed
fashion.
3.1 Motivations
As is apparent from the ever-increasing demand for wireless services, next-generation
data communications call for extremely high data rates with QoS requirements. Due
to the intolerance of errors of data transmissions, the level of satisfaction achieved
by each user is proportional to the amount of information correctly delivered at the
destination. Nevertheless, mobility of user terminals represents a mandatory feature of
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modern wireless systems. As a consequence, energy consumption of battery-powered
terminals should play a central role in designing wireless data networks.
Hence, although many formulations of the power control problem in wireless data
networks do exist, as detailed in Sect. 1.4.2, these considerations motivate us to focus
on energy efficient criteria. In a wireless network with (mostly) battery-powered mo-
bile terminals, a primary goal is in fact the maximization of the number of transmitted
bits per energy unit rather than the pure maximization of the throughput of the link.
This goal can be achieved through application of a noncooperative game wherein the
users are allowed to choose their transmit powers according to a utility-maximization
criterion, where the utility is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power.
As already seen in Chapter 1, an important feature of the game-theoretic approach
is the inherent de-centralization of the algorithms for power control, which allows each
user to individually choose its own transmit power through a simple noncooperative
scheme. The advantages of noncooperative (distributed) approaches with respect to
a cooperative (centralized) approach are mainly due to the scalability of the network.
Many of the problems to be solved in a communications system are in fact known
to be NP-hard. As a consequence, real-time solution of these optimization problems
in a centralized fashion becomes infeasible as the network size increases and as the
number of users varies. The performance loss of distributed schemes with respect to
centralized allocation is studied in Chapter 5.
The prominent characteristic of the game-theoretic approach, which justifies its
widespread range of applications, is its capability of distributing decision-making
processes among “rational” users, once benefits and drawbacks of the actions they
are allowed to choose are quantified. Although game theory was originally developed
to predict the outcome of interactions among economic agents, it is apparent that
this framework also fits the situation of resource competition in wireless networks.
3.2 Formulation
The problem of energy-efficient power allocation in the uplink of the TH-UWB data
network depicted in Chapter 2 can be addressed resorting to the game-theoretic
framework described in Chapter 1.
In this network, every terminal is assumed to be rational, i.e., it locally and selfishly
chooses its action to maximize its own utility. As is apparent from (2.6), the strategy
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chosen by a user, i.e., his/her transmit power, affects the performance of the other
users in terms of received SINR through MAI. Furthermore, since a realistic TH-
UWB transmission takes place in frequency-selective multipath channels, the effect
of SI cannot be neglected.
To pose the power control problem as a noncooperative game, a suitable definition of
a utility function is needed to measure energy efficiency for wireless data applications.
A tradeoff relationship exists between obtaining high SINR levels and consuming low
energy. These issues can be quantified [114] by defining the utility function of the kth
user to be the ratio of its throughput Tk to its transmit power pk, i.e.
uk (a) = uk (p) =
Tk
pk
, (3.1)
where p = [p1, . . . , pK ] is the vector of transmit powers, with K denoting the number
of users in the network.
Throughput, here referred to as the goodput , i.e., the net number of information bits
that are received without error per unit time, can be expressed as
Tk =
D
M
Rkfs (γk) , (3.2)
where D and M are the number of information bits and the total number of bits
in a packet, respectively; Rk and γk are the transmission rate and the SINR for the
kth user, respectively; and fs (γk) is the efficiency function representing the packet
success rate (PSR), i.e., the probability that a packet is received without an error.
Our assumption is that a packet will be retransmitted if it has one or more bit errors.
The PSR depends on the details of the data transmission, including its modulation,
coding, and packet size [102]. To prevent the mathematical anomalies described
in [55], we replace PSR with an efficiency function f (γk) when calculating the
throughput for our utility function. A useful example for the efficiency function is
f (γk) =
(
1− e−γk/2
)M
, which serves as a reasonable approximation to the PSR for
moderate-to-large values of M . The plot of this efficiency function is given in Fig. 3.1
with M = 100. The interested reader may refer to [106] for a detailed discussion of
this efficiency function.
However, our analysis throughout this thesis is valid for any efficiency function that
is increasing, S-shaped,1 and continuously differentiable, with f (0) = 0, f (+∞) = 1,
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the function is concave, and
below which the function is convex.
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Figure 3.1: Typical shape of the efficiency function (M = 100).
and f ′(0) = df (γk) /dγk|γk=0 = 0. These assumptions are valid in many practical
systems. Furthermore, we assume that all users have the same efficiency func-
tion. Generalization to the case where the efficiency function is dependent on k is
straightforward. Note that this formulation could be extended to capacity-maximizing
approaches (e.g., those proposed by Sung and Wong [122], and by Alpcan et al. [5])
by replacing the throughput Tk in (3.2) with the Shannon capacity formula, provided
that uk (p) in (3.1) is appropriately modified to ensure uk (p) = 0 when pk = 0.
Combining (3.1) and (3.2), and replacing the PSR with f (γk),
uk (p) =
D
M
Rk
f (γk)
pk
. (3.3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, represents the total number of
data bits that are delivered to the destination without an error per Joule of energy
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Figure 3.2: User’s utility as a function of transmit power for a fixed interference.
consumed, capturing the tradeoff between throughput and battery life. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the transmission rate is the same for all users, i.e.,
R1 = · · · = RK = R. All the results obtained here can easily be generalized to the
case of unequal rates. Fig. 3.2 shows the shape of the utility function in (3.3) as a
function of transmit power keeping other users’ transmit power fixed (the meaning of
p∗ and u∗ will be provided in the remainder of this chapter).
3.3 The noncooperative power control game
In this section, we propose a noncooperative power control game (NPCG) in which
every user seeks to maximize his/her own utility by choosing his/her transmit power.
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Let G = [K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] be the proposed noncooperative strategic-form game
where K = {1, . . . ,K} is the index set for the terminal users; Ak = Pk =
[
p
k
, pk
]
is the pure-strategy set, with p
k
and pk denoting minimum and maximum power
constraints, respectively; and uk (a) = uk (p) is the payoff function for user k [110].
Throughout this thesis, we assume p
k
= 0 and pk = p > 0 for all k ∈ K.
Formally, following the notation introduced in Sect. 1.2, the NPCG can be expressed
as
max
pk∈Pk
uk (p) = max
pk∈Pk
uk
(
pk,p\k
)
, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (3.4)
where p\k denotes the vector of transmit powers of all terminals except terminal k.
The latter notation is used to emphasize that the kth user has control over its own
power pk only. Assuming equal transmission rate for all users, (3.4) can be rewritten
as
max
pk∈Pk
f
(
γk
(
pk,p\k
))
pk
, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (3.5)
where we have explicitly shown that γk is a function of p, as expressed in (2.6).
3.3.1 Existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
The solution that is most widely used for noncooperative game theoretic problems
is the Nash equilibrium, introduced in Definition 4. Formally, a power vector p∗ =
[p∗1, . . . , p
∗
K ] is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G = [K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] if, for every
k ∈ K, uk
(
p∗k,p
∗
\k
)
≥ uk
(
pk,p
∗
\k
)
for all pk ∈ Pk.
The Nash equilibrium concept offers a predictable, stable outcome of a noncoop-
erative game where multiple agents with conflicting interests compete through self-
optimization and reach a point where no player wishes to deviate. However, such a
point does not necessarily exist. First, we investigate the existence of an equilibrium
in the NPCG.
Theorem 3 At least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the NPCG G =
[K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}]. Furthermore, the unconstrained maximization of the utility func-
tion occurs when each user k achieves an SINR γ∗k that is a solution of
f ′(γ∗k) · γ
∗
k · (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) = f (γ
∗
k) , (3.6)
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where
γ0,k =
h
(SP)
k
h
(SI)
k
= N ·
(
β
H
k ·αk
)2
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 ≥ 1 (3.7)
is the signal-to-self-interference ratio (SSIR), and f ′(γ∗k) = df (γk) /dγk|γk=γ∗k .
Proof The NPCG belongs to the category of infinite games, since the joint strategy
set of transmit power P = ×kPk is infinite. Hence, the existence of pure-strategy
Nash equilibria can be proven using Theorem 2, described in Sect. 1.2.2.
In particular, (at least) one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the noncoop-
erative game G = [K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] if, for all k = 1, . . . ,K:
1. Pk is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space RK ;
and
2. uk (p) is continuous in p and quasi-concave in pk.
Each user k has a strategy space that is defined by a minimum power p
k
and a
maximum power pk, and all power values in between. We also assume that pk ≥ pk.
Thus, the first condition is satisfied.
Since pk ≥ 0, it is apparent from (2.6) and (3.3) and that uk (p) is continuous in p.
To show that the utility function uk (p) is quasi-concave in pk for all k in the NPCG,
it is sufficient to prove that the local maximum of uk (p) is at the same time a global
maximum [101,105].
For a differentiable function, the first-order necessary optimality condition is given
by ∂uk (p) /∂pk = 0. Recalling (2.6) and (3.3), the partial derivative of uk (p) with
respect to pk is
∂uk (p)
∂pk
=
DR
Mp2k
(f ′(γk) · γk · (1− γk/γ0,k)− f (γk)) , (3.8)
where the SSIR γ0,k is defined as in (3.7) and f
′(γk) = df (γk) /dγk. For the sake of
simplicity, we do not explicitly show the dependence of γk on pk.
Since pk ≥ 0 in G, we examine only positive real numbers. Evaluating (3.8) at pk = 0,
we get ∂uk (pk,p−k) /∂pk = 0. Therefore, pk = 0 is a stationary point and the value
of utility at this point is uk (p) = 0. If we evaluate utility in the ε-neighborhood of
pk = 0, where ε is a small positive number, we notice that the utility is positive, which
implies utility is increasing at pk = 0. Hence, pk = 0 cannot be a local maximum.
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For nonzero values of the transmit power, we examine the values of γ∗k = γk(p
∗
k) such
that ∂uk (pk,p−k) /∂pk|pk=p∗k = 0, thus satisfying the first-order necessary optimality
condition.
In other words, we evaluate γ∗k such that
γ∗k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) = f (γ
∗
k) /f
′(γ∗k), (3.9)
as shown in (3.6). We observe that the left-hand side of (3.9) is a concave parabola
with its vertex in γk = γ0,k/2 > 0, and d (γk (1− γk/γ0,k)) /dγk|γk=0 = 1. The
right-hand side is an increasing function, with d (f (γk) /f
′(γk)) /dγk|γk=0 = 1/ℓ < 1
when f ′(0) = 0, where ℓ = min{n ∈ N : dnf (γk) /dγnk |γk=0 6= 0}. Furthermore, the
equation is satisfied at γk = 0. Therefore, there is a single value γ
∗
k that satisfies
(3.6) for γk > 0. The second-order partial derivative of the utility with respect to the
power reveals that this point is a local maximum and therefore a global maximum.
Hence, the utility function of user k is quasi-concave in pk for all k.
The same conclusion applies also if p∗k > pk for some k, even though γ
∗
k cannot be
achieved. In fact, by applying the previous considerations to (3.8), it is easy to verify
that uk
(
pk,p\k
)
is strictly increasing in γk ∈ [0, γk(p∗k) = γ
∗
k), which in turn, from
(2.6), is strictly increasing in pk ∈ [0, p
∗
k). Since pk ∈ [pk, pk], which is a subset of
[0, p∗k), uk
(
pk = pk,p\k
)
represents both the local and the global maximum of the
utility function. 
To illustrate (3.9) graphically, we consider f (γk) =
(
1− e−γk/2
)M
as a useful exam-
ple for the efficiency function. Expressing f ′(γk) in terms of f (γk) and rearranging
terms, we get
γ∗k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) =
2
M
(
e+γ
∗
k/2 − 1
)
. (3.10)
The graphical solution is shown in Fig. 3.3. The solid lines report left-hand and right-
hand side of (3.10), respectively, while the dashed lines correspond to the tangent lines
of the two curves in γk = 0. In this particular case, ℓ =M , γ0,k = 8.5 and γ
∗
k ≅ 7.54.
Lemma 1 The solution γ∗k of (3.6) satisfies the condition
0 ≤ γ∗k < γ0,k. (3.11)
Proof As f (γ∗k) is an increasing function of γ
∗
k , f
′(γ∗k) ≥ 0 for every γ
∗
k . Since the
existence of the solution is ensured by Theorem 3 and γ∗k and f (γ
∗
k) are both greater
than zero, the condition (1− γ∗k/γ0,k) > 0 must hold. 
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the equilibrium point (γ0,k = 8.5 = 9.3 dB, ℓ = M = 100).
3.3.2 Uniqueness of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium can be seen from another point of view. Using the concepts
introduced in Sect. 1.2.2, the power level chosen by a rational self-optimizing user
constitutes a best response to the powers chosen by other players. Formally, terminal
k’s best response rk : P\k → Pk is the correspondence that assigns to each p\k ∈ P\k
the set
rk
(
p\k
)
=
{
pk ∈ Pk : uk
(
pk,p\k
)
≥ uk
(
p′k,p\k
)
for all p′k ∈ Pk
}
, (3.12)
where P\k is the strategy space of all users excluding user k.
With the notion of a terminal’s best response, the Nash equilibrium can be restated
in a compact form: the power vector p∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the NPCG G =
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[K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] if and only if p∗k ∈ rk
(
p∗\k
)
for all k ∈ K.
Prop. 1 Using the above definition in the NPCG, with a slight abuse of notation,
terminal k’s best response to a given interference vector p\k is [110]
rk
(
p\k
)
= min(p, p∗k), (3.13)
where
p∗k = arg max
pk∈R+
uk
(
pk,p\k
)
=
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k)
(3.14)
is the unconstrained maximizer of the utility in (3.3) (see Fig. 3.2). Furthermore, p∗k
is unique.
Proof Using Theorem 3, for a given interference, the SINR γ∗k corresponds to the
transmit power p∗k as in (3.14). Since γ
∗
k is the unique maximizer of the utility, the
correspondence between the transmit power and the SINR must be studied. As can be
verified, (3.14) represents the equation of a hyperbola passing through the origin, with
the asymptotes parallel to the Cartesian axes. In particular, the vertical asymptote
is γ∗k = γ0,k. Therefore, using Lemma 1, there exists a one-to-one correspondence
between the transmit power, p∗k ∈ [0,+∞), and the SINR, γ
∗
k ∈ [0, γ0,k). Thus, p
∗
k is
also unique. If p∗k /∈ Pk for some user k, since it is not a feasible point, then p
∗
k cannot
be the best response to a given p\k. In this case, we observe that ∂uk (p) /∂pk ≤ 0
for any γk ≤ γ∗k, and hence for any pk ≤ p
∗
k. This implies that the utility function is
increasing in that region. Since p is the largest power in the strategy space, it yields
the highest utility among all pk ≤ p and thus is the best response to p\k. 
It is worth noting that, at any equilibrium of the NPCG, a terminal either attains
the utility maximizing SINR γ∗k or it fails to do so and transmits at maximum power
p.
Theorem 4 The NPCG G = [K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] has a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
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Proof By Theorem 3, we know that there exists an equilibrium in the NPCG. Let p
denote the Nash equilibrium in the NPCG. By definition, the Nash equilibrium must
satisfy p = r(p), where r(p) = [r1 (p) , . . . , rK (p)].
Using Yates’ framework [137], the fixed point p = r(p) is unique if the correspon-
dence r(p) is a standard function, i.e., if it satisfies the following properties:
1. positivity: r(p) > 0;
2. monotonicity: if p ≥ p′, then r(p) ≥ r(p′);
3. scalability: for all η > 1, ηr(p) > r(ηp).
It is apparent that rk (p) = rk
(
p\k
)
. Taking into account (3.13) and (3.14), the first
condition translates into p∗k > 0 for all k ∈ K. Using (2.6), (2.9) and (3.11), the proof
is straightforward. Recalling (3.13) and (3.14), the second and the third condition
are also apparent, since p\k modifies only the numerator of (3.14). Therefore, since
r(p) is a standard function, the Nash equilibrium of the NPCG is unique. 
3.4 The best-response iterative algorithm
3.4.1 Implementation
In the following, we present an iterative algorithm that applies to the UWB wireless
network described in Chapter 2 to distributely achieve the Nash equilibrium of the
NPCG proposed in Sect. 3.3. This algorithm is applicable to all types of Rake
receivers, as well as to any kind of channel model. The description of the algorithm
is as follows.
The best-response power-control (BRPC) algorithm
Consider a network with K users, a processing gain N = Nf ·Nc, a channel with L
fading paths, and a maximum transmit power p.
1. Simulate the channel fading coefficients αk for all users according to the chosen
channel model.
2. Set the Rake receivers coefficients βk for all users according to the chosen
receiver (i.e., according to the processing matrix G).
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3. Compute the SP term, h
(SP)
k , the SI term, h
(SI)
k , the MAI term, h
(MAI)
kj , according
to (2.7)-(2.9), and the optimum SINR, γ∗k , solution of (3.6), for all users.
4. Initialize randomly the transmit powers of all users p(0) within the range [0, p].
5. Set m = 0.
6. Compute the received SINR γ
(m)
k at the AP for each user according to (2.6).
7. Set k = 1.
8. Adjust the kth transmit power according to (3.13) and to
p
(m+1)
k = p
(m)
k ·
γ∗k
γ
(m)
k
·
1− γ
(m)
k /γ0,k
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
, (3.15)
where γ0,k is defined as in (3.7).
9. k = k + 1.
10. If k ≤ K, then go back to Step 8.
11. m = m+ 1.
12. Stop if the powers have converged; otherwise, go to Step 6.
This is a best-response algorithm, since at each stage m a user decides to transmit
at a power that maximizes its own utility (i.e., its best-response strategy), given the
current conditions of the system. Note that, from (3.6), γ∗k depends on the efficiency
function f (γk) and the SSIR γ0,k only. This means that γ
∗
k can be assumed constant
when the channel characteristics remain unchanged, irrespective of the transmit pow-
ers p(m) and of the channel coefficients of the other users. As will be better shown in
Chapter 4, this allows the users to compute their own γ∗k at Step 3 independently of
each other before the iterative updating mechanism starts.
Looking at Step 8, it may appear from (3.14) that the each user should know its
own transmit power p
(m)
k and SSIR γ0,k, as well as some other quantities (p
(m)
j and
h
(MAI)
kj for j 6= k) relevant to all of the other users in the network. On the contrary, it
turns out that user k only needs to know its own received SINR at the AP γ
(m)
k . In
fact, the term due to interference-plus-noise in (3.14) can be obtained from (2.6) as
∑
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj p
(m)
j + σ
2 = h
(SP)
k p
(m)
k ·
1− γ
(m)
k /γ0,k
γ
(m)
k
, (3.16)
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where p
(m)
k is the transmit power of user k at the mth iteration. Therefore, after
straightforwardmanipulation, (3.14) translates into the noncooperative update (3.15).
The received SINR γ
(m)
k can be fed back to the user terminal from the AP, along with
SP and SI terms. This represents the only amount of feedback information required
by the BRPC algorithm, which allows for a completely distributed scheme. Note that
(3.15) reduces to the update mechanism in the algorithm by Foschini and Miljanic
when γ0,k →∞. This degenerated case will be further detailed in Chapter 4.
Finally, it is worth noting that the BRPC algorithm works for any initial transmit
power vector p(0), as stated in Step 4. However, the total amount of power consumed
by each user k to reach the Nash equilibrium can be reduced by a proper choice of the
initial allocation p(0), which assumes that the networks is a single-user (SU) system.
Prop. 2 If each user k chooses p
(0)
k such that
p
(0)
k = min
(
p, p
(0)
k,SU
)
, (3.17)
where
p
(0)
k,SU =
σ2
h
(SP)
k
·
γ∗k
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
, (3.18)
the updated transmit powers
{
p
(m)
k
}
represent a nondecreasing sequence converging
to the Nash equilibrium.
Proof The sequence
{
p
(m)
k
}
is nondecreasing if and only if p
(m+1)
k ≥ p
(m)
k for all m.
In view of the update (3.15), this is verified if and only if γ
(m)
k ≤ γ
∗
k for all m. In
particular, this condition must hold for m = 0. Supposing p
(0)
k,SU ≤ p, combining (2.6)
and (3.18) yields
γ
(0)
k =
σ2 · γ∗k/ (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k)
σ2
γ0,k
· γ∗k/ (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) +
∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj p
(0)
j + σ
2
≤
σ2 · γ∗k/ (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k)
σ2
γ0,k
· γ∗k/ (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) + σ
2
=
(
1
γ0,k
+
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
γ∗k
)−1
= γ∗k , (3.19)
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Table 3.1: List of parameters used in the simulations.
K, number of users 4
L, number of channel paths 20
Nc, number of possible pulse positions in a frame 10
Nf , number of frames 8
M , total number of bits per packet 100 b
D, number of information bits per packet 100 b
R, bit rate 100 kb/s
σ2, AWGN power at the receiver 5× 10−16W
p, maximum power constraint 1 nW
where the inequality follows from h
(MAI)
kj p
(0)
j ≥ 0 for all j 6= k. Hence, p
(1)
k ≥ p
(0)
k
when p
(0)
k = p
(0)
k,SU .
If this mechanism is employed by all users in the network, p(1) ≥ p(0). In view of
the monotonicity of standard function r(p), shown in the proof of Theorem 4, the
sequence
{
p(m)
}
is nondecreasing and bounded above by p∗. Theorem 4 implies that{
p(m)
}
must converge to p∗.
This conclusion holds even if p
(0)
k,SU > p for some users k ∈ K. By means of Lemma
1, which states the monotonic one-to-one correspondence between p
(m)
k and γ
(m)
k ,
γ
(0)
k = γk
(
p,p\k
)
< γk
(
p
(0)
k,SU ,p\k
)
. Therefore, (3.19) still holds, and the same
conclusion applies. 
Fig. 3.4 reports the transmit power p
(m)
k for a generic user k as a function of the
iteration index m for a particular network snapshot. Simulations are performed using
the design parameters listed in Table 3.1. We use the efficiency function f (γk) =
(1 − e−γk/2)M as a reasonable approximation to the PSR [50, 110]. To model the
UWB scenario, the channel gains are assumed to be Rayleigh-distributed. A detailed
discussion on the channel model is provided in Chapter 4. The solid line shows
the update sequence when all users choose their initial transmit powers according to
(3.17) and (3.18). The dashed and dotted lines represent the update sequences for
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Figure 3.4: Transmit power as a function of the iteration step for a generic user k.
two random allocations p(0). As can be seen, the initialization outlined in Prop. 2
produces a nondecreasing sequence that converges to the transmit power p∗k faster
than the others and saving as much power as possible. It is worth noting that a
distributed implementation is possible even in this case, provided that the terminals
are able to measure the output variance due to ambient AWGN σ2.
Similarly, Fig. 3.5 depicts the achieved SINR γ
(m)
k for the network realization used for
the results of Fig. 3.4. Analogous considerations about the behavior of the algorithm
can be drawn.
3.4.2 Convergence to the Nash equilibrium
The BRPC algorithm can be shown to converge to a unique fixed point using the
properties of standard power control [137], following the same steps as in the proof of
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Figure 3.5: Achieved SINR at the AP as a function of the iteration step for a generic user
k.
Theorem 4.
In fact, the existence of (at least) one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the NPCG
G = [K, {Pk}, {uk (p)}] is ensured by Theorem 3, whereas the uniqueness is shown
in Theorem 4. Since the update (3.15) represents the best response p∗k to a given set
of interferers p\k, it is apparent that the unique fixed point of the BRPC algorithm
corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium of the NPCG G. Hence, the BRPC
algorithm can be used to allow all the terminals in the considered network to achieve
the Nash equilibrium of G in a distributed manner.
The convergence of the BRPC algorithm can also be verified using the analytical
tools of game theory. As stated in Sect. 3.3, the NPCG G represents a static (strategic-
form) game. Following the definitions introduced in Sect. 1.3, it is apparent that, by
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iterating the game G through the BRPC algorithm, the users in the network play
a repeated myopic game. The shortsight lies in that the users do not consider the
convergence speed of the algorithm, i.e., the proposed formulation of the game does
not assign a discount factor to each iteration of the BRPC algorithm.
To prove that the BRPC algorithm converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of
the proposed game G, we resort to the theory of supermodular games, introduced in
1979 by Topkis [123,124] and used by Saraydar [110] and Altman and Altman [6] in
the context of power control. In a supermodular power control game, each player’s
desire to increase its power increases with an increase in other players’ power, i.e.,
the best response of a terminal is monotone nondecreasing in interferers’ (opponents’)
strategy. Using a method similar to that described in [110], the repeated game G can
be shown to belong to the class of supermodular games. This allows the convergence
of the algorithm to be studied through the analytical tools derived in [124]. Such tools
are expedient to prove that the distributed scheme proposed in Sect. 3.4.1 leads to a
system of best-response correspondences that have a unique fixed point, i.e., that the
BRPC algorithm converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the NPCG G discussed
in Sect. 3.3.
Chapter 4
Analysis of the Nash
equilibrium
In Chapter 3, we have proven that a Nash equilibrium for the proposed noncooperative
power control game exists and is unique. In this Chapter, we study the properties of
this equilibrium.
In particular, Sect. 4.1 identifies the main properties of the Nash solution of the
power control game, which is shown to depend on the interfering terms due to SI
and MAI. To provide a theoretical description of the Nash equilibrium which is
independent of the channel snapshot, Sect. 4.2 proposes a large-system analysis of the
interference. To better understand the interplay between the network parameters and
the performance of the distributed algorithm, a specific channel model is considered.
Making use of the asymptotical values for SI and MAI terms derived in Sect. 4.2,
Sect. 4.3 shows the analytical description of the relevant performance indexes of
the network, namely transmit powers and achieved utilities. System design criteria,
such as minimum spreading factor and loss of PRake-based networks with respect to
ARake-based networks, are also derived. Simulation results are presented to validate
the theoretical analysis.
4.1 Properties of the Nash equilibrium
Although the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the NPCG G
described in Sect. 3.3 is ensured by Theorems 3 and 4, it is of interest to study the
properties of this solution and thus to evaluate the performance of the system. Fur-
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thermore, the knowledge of the main features of the Nash solution can also profitably
serve as a network design criterion, as is better explained in the remainder of this
chapter.
As is apparent from inspecting (3.6), unlike previous work in this area (e.g., [79,85,
110, 114]), the SINR achieved at the Nash equilibrium γ∗k is dependent on k. This
is due to the SI term in (2.6), which arises when modeling the wireless channel as a
frequency-selective one. As a consequence, at the Nash equilibrium each user attains a
different level of SINR. More importantly, the only term dependent on k in (3.6) is the
SSIR γ0,k, which is affected only by the channel of user k. This means that γ
∗
k can be
assumed constant when the channel characteristics remain unchanged, irrespective
of the transmit powers p and of the channel coefficients of the other users. For
convenience of notation, we can express γ∗k as a function of γ0,k:
γ∗k = Γ (γ0,k) . (4.1)
Fig. 4.1 shows the shape of γ∗k as a function of γ0,k, where the efficiency function is
taken as f (γk) = (1− e−γk/2)M , with M = 100. Even though γ∗k is shown for values
of γ0,k approaching 0 dB, it is worth emphasizing that γ0,k > 10 dB in most practical
situations.
As can be noticed, the NPCG proposed herein represents a generalization of the
power control games discussed thoroughly in literature [40, 55, 79, 85, 109, 110], in
which the power update mechanism follows the formulation by Foschini and Miljanic.
If L = 1, i.e., in a flat-fading scenario, we obtain from (2.8) and (3.7) that γ0,k =∞
for all k. This implies that γ∗k = Γ (∞) = γ
∗ is the same for every k ∈ K, and thus it
is possible to apply the approach proposed, e.g., in [110].
Assumption 1 To simplify the analysis, let us assume the typical case of multiuser
UWB systems, where N ≫ K. In addition, p is considered sufficiently large that
pk < p for those users who achieve γ
∗
k. In particular, when N ≫ K, at the Nash
equilibrium the following property holds:
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k ≃ q > 0, ∀k ∈ K. (4.2)
The heuristic derivation of (4.2) can be justified by SI reduction due to the hypothesis
N ≫ K > 1. Using (2.8), γ0,k ≫ 1 for all k. Hence, the noncooperative solution will
be similar to that studied, e.g., in [79].
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Figure 4.1: Shape of γ∗k as a function of γ0,k (M = 100).
The validity of this assumption is verified through extensive simulations using the
UWB channel model reported in [28]. Table 4.1 reports the ratio σ2q/η
2
q of the variance
σ2q to the squared mean value η
2
q of the values q = h
(SP)
k p
∗
k, obtained averaging 10 000
realizations of channel coefficients for different network parameters using ARake
receivers. We can see that, when the processing gain is much greater than the number
of users, σ2q/η
2
q ≪ 1. Hence, (4.2) can be used to carry out the theoretical analysis of
the Nash equilibrium. It is worth emphasizing that similar results are achieved using
different channel models and/or PRake receivers.
The following proposition helps identify the Nash equilibrium for a given set of
channel realizations.
Prop. 3 A necessary and sufficient condition for a desired SINR γ∗k to be achievable
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Table 4.1: Ratio σ2q/η
2
q for different network parameters.
(L,K)
(Nc, Nf) (20,8) (20,16) (50,8) (50,16)
(30,10) 9.4E− 4 3.2E− 3 4.8E− 4 1.7E− 3
(30,50) 2.9E− 5 6.4E− 5 1.6E− 5 3.4E− 5
(50,10) 2.9E− 4 6.8E− 4 1.5E− 4 3.7E− 4
(50,50) 1.0E− 5 2.2E− 5 0.6E− 5 1.2E− 5
(100,10) 6.7E− 5 1.5E− 4 3.7E− 5 7.8E− 5
(100,50) 0.3E− 5 0.6E− 5 0.1E− 5 0.3E− 5
is
γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1, ∀k ∈ K, (4.3)
where γ0,k is defined as in (3.7), and
ζ−1k =
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
. (4.4)
When (4.3) holds, each user can reach the optimum SINR, and the minimum power
solution to do so is to assign each user k a transmit power
p∗k =
1
h
(SP)
k
·
σ2γ∗k
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) . (4.5)
When (4.3) does not hold, the users cannot achieve γ∗k simultaneously, and some of
them would end up transmitting at the maximum power p.
Proof Based on Prop. 1, when all users reach the Nash equilibrium, their transmit
powers are
p∗k =
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj p
∗
j + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k)
. (4.6)
Using Assumption 1 in (4.6), it is straightforward to obtain:
q ·
[
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)]
= σ2γ∗k > 0, (4.7)
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which implies
γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1, (4.8)
proving necessity. It is also straightforward to show that, if each terminal k uses
transmit power p∗k as in (4.5), all terminals will achieve the SINR requirement,
finishing the proof of sufficiency.
Finally, consider any other joint distribution of powers and channel realizations, and
let q′ = infk∈K
{
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k
}
. Then, from (4.6), by definition of q′, for some k
q′ =
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj p
∗
j + σ
2
)
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
. (4.9)
Hence,
q′ (1− γ∗k/γ0,k) = γ
∗
k

∑
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj p
∗
j + σ
2


= γ∗k

∑
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
· h
(SP)
j p
∗
j + σ
2


≥ γ∗k

∑
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
q′ + σ2


= γ∗k
(
ζ−1k q
′ + σ2
)
, (4.10)
where the inequality holds due to definition of q′. Therefore,
q′ (1− γ∗k/γ0,k − γ
∗
k/ζk) ≥ γ
∗
kσ
2, (4.11)
and thus
q′ ≥
σ2γ∗k
1− γ∗k
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) = q. (4.12)
By definition, q′ = q.
This means that assigning powers according to (4.5) does indeed give the minimal
power solution. 
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4.2 Large-system analysis of the interference
Based on Prop. 3, the amount of transmit power p∗k required to achieve the target
SINR γ∗k will depend not only on the gain h
(SP)
k , but also on the SI term h
(SI)
k (through
γ0,k) and the interferers h
(MAI)
kj (through ζk). In order to derive some quantitative
results for the utility function and for the transmit powers independent of SI and
MAI terms, it is possible to resort to a large-system analysis [14]. For convenience of
notation, we introduce the following definitions, with Var[·] denoting the variance of
a random variable:
• let Dαj be a diagonal matrix whose elements are
{
Dαj
}
l
=
√
Var
[
α
(j)
l
]
; (4.13)
• let Dβk be a diagonal matrix whose elements are
{
Dβk
}
l
=
√
Var
[
β
(k)
l
]
; (4.14)
• let Cαj be an L× (L− 1) matrix whose elements are
{
Cαj
}
li
=
√
Var [{Aj}li]
L
; (4.15)
• let Cβj be an L× (L− 1) matrix whose elements are
{
Cβk
}
li
=
√
Var [{Bk}li]
L
; (4.16)
• let ϕ (·) be the matrix operator
ϕ (·) = lim
L→∞
1
L
Tr(·), (4.17)
where Tr(·) is the trace operator.
Theorem 5 Assume that α
(k)
l are zero-mean random variables (RVs) independent
across k and l, and G is a deterministic diagonal matrix (thus implying that α
(k)
l and
β
(j)
m are dependent only when j = k and m = l). In the asymptotic case where K and
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Nf are finite,
1 while L,Nc → ∞, with the ratio Nc/L approaching a constant, the
term ζ−1K converges almost surely (a.s.) to
ζ−1k
a.s.
→
1
N
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
+ ϕ
(
DβkC
α
jC
α
j
HDβk
)
ϕ
(
DαjD
β
j
)
· ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
) . (4.18)
Proof To prove that Nζ−1k converges a.s. to non-random limits, we focus on the
ratio
N
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
=
∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣βHk ·αj∣∣∣2(
βHk ·αk
)
·
(
βHj ·αj
)
=
1
L2
[∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣2+∣∣∣βHk ·αj∣∣∣2
]
1
L
(
βHk ·αk
)
· 1L
(
βHj ·αj
) . (4.19)
It is sufficient to show that both numerator and denominator of (4.19) converge a.s.
to a non-random limit. Let
βk = Gαk
= (G ◦Dαk )w
(k)
= Dβkw
(k), (4.20)
where
w(k) = (Dαk )
−1
αk; (4.21)
Dαk and D
β
k are defined as in (4.13) and (4.14), respectively; the operator ◦ denotes
the Hadamard (element-wise) product; and the matrix G is dependent on the type
of Rake receiver employed. Using (4.20) and (4.21), by Theorem 7, presented in the
1In order for the analysis to be consistent, and also considering regulations by the FCC [31], it is
worth noting that Nf could not be smaller than a certain threshold (Nf ≥ 5).
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Appendix A, we obtain
1
L2
∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→ ϕ
(
1
L
Dαj BkB
H
k D
α
j
)
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L∑
i=1
{Dαj }
2
i
L∑
l=i+1
(
β
(k)
l
)2
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
l=1
(
β
(k)
l+1
)2 l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
χl, (4.22)
where ϕ (·) is defined as in (4.17), and
χl =
1
L
(
β
(k)
l+1
)2 l∑
m=1
{
Dαj
}2
m
(4.23)
are independent random variables, with
E [χl] =
1
L
{
Dβk
}2
l+1
l∑
m=1
{
Dαj
}2
m
(4.24)
and
Var [χl] =
1
L2
Var
[(
β
(k)
l+1
)2]( l∑
m=1
{
Dαj
}2
m
)2
≤ Var
[(
β
(k)
l+1
)2]
·

Tr
((
Dαj
)2)
L


2
<∞. (4.25)
Using the weak version of the law of large numbers for non-i.i.d. random variables,
lim
L→∞
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
χl
a.s.
→ lim
L→∞
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
E [χl]
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
l=1
{
Dβk
}2
l+1
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m
= ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
, (4.26)
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where Cαk and C
β
k are defined as in (4.15) and (4.16), respectively.
Similar arguments yield
1
L2
∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→ ϕ(DβkCαjCαj HDβk) . (4.27)
Then applying Theorem 8, reported in the Appendix A, from (4.20) we obtain
1
L
βHk ·αj
a.s.
→ 0, (4.28)
since βk is independent of αj . Analogously, using Theorem 7, from (4.21) we obtain
1
L
βHk ·αk
a.s.
→ ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
)
. (4.29)
Using (4.26)-(4.29), the result (4.18) is straightforward. 
Theorem 6 Assume α
(k)
l and G as in Theorem 5. In the asymptotic case where K
and Nf are finite, while L,Nc →∞, with the ratio Nc/L approaching a constant,
γ−10,k
a.s.
→
1
N
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i)
(
ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
))2 , (4.30)
where φi is defined as in (2.12) and
θk (l, L+ l − i) = {D
α
k}l
{
Dβk
}
L+l−i
+
{
Dβk
}
l
{Dαk }L+l−i . (4.31)
Proof In order to prove that N/γ0,k converges a.s. to a non-random limit, it is
sufficient to show that both the numerator and the denominator converge to non-
random limits. Note that
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 = L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
(
i∑
l=1
α
(k)
l β
(k)
L+l−i +
i∑
l=1
β
(k)
l α
(k)
L+l−i
)2
=
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
(
i∑
l=1
θk (l, L+ l− i) ·w
(k)
l ·w
(k)
L+l−i
)2
,
(4.32)
where θk (l, L+ l − i) is defined as in (4.31).
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Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 5, after some algebraic manip-
ulation, it can be proven that
1
L2
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→ lim
L→∞
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i)
L2
. (4.33)
Using (4.29) and (4.33), the result (4.30) is straightforward. 
It is worth emphasize that the results above can be applied to any kind of fading
models, since only the second-order statistics are required. Furthermore, due to the
symmetry of (4.18) and (4.30), it is easy to verify that the results are independent
of large-scale fading models. Hence, Theorems 5 and 6 apply to any kind of channel,
which may include both large- and small-scale statistics.
4.2.1 Hypotheses on the channel model
To better understand the performance of power control, in the following we derive
the asymptotic values of the transmit powers p∗k and the utilities u
∗
k achieved at the
Nash equilibrium by using the results (4.18) and (4.30) in a realistic UWB network
scenario.
Channel modeling for UWB systems is still an open issue. In fact, while there exists
a commonly agreed-on set of basic models for narrowband and wideband wireless
channels [125], a similarly well accepted UWB channel model does not seem to exist.
Recently, two models, namely IEEE 802.15.3a [45] and IEEE 802.15.4a [87], have
been standardized to properly characterize the UWB environment. However, for ease
of calculation, the expressions derived in the remainder of the paper consider the
following simplifying assumptions:
• The channel gains are zero-mean independent complex Gaussian RVs with vari-
ances σ2kl , i.e., α
(k)
l ∼ CN (0, σ
2
kl
). This assumption leads
∣∣∣α(k)l ∣∣∣ to be Rayleigh-
distributed with parameter σ2kl/2. Although both IEEE 802.15.3a and 802.15.4a
models include some forms of Nakagami-m distribution for the channel gains,
the Rayleigh distribution, appealing for its analytical tractability, has recently
been shown [112] to provide a good approximation for multipath propagation
in UWB systems.
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Figure 4.2: Average power delay profile versus normalized excess delay.
• Lately, a clustering phenomenon for the averaged power delay profile (aPDP)
[62] in IR-UWB multipath channels has emerged from a large number of UWB
measurement campaigns [30, 115]. However, owing to the analytical difficulties
arising when considering such aspect, this work focuses on an exponentially
decaying aPDP, as is customarily used in several UWB channel models [52,104].
This translates into the hypothesis
σ2kl = σ
2
k · Λ
− l−1
L−1 , (4.34)
where Λ = σ2k1/σ
2
kL
is the aPDP decay constant; and σ2k depends on the distance
between user k and the AP. Fig. 4.2 shows the aPDP for some values of Λ versus
the normalized excess delay, i.e., the ratio between the excess delay, lTc, and
the maximum excess delay considered, LTc. It is easy to verify that Λ = 0 dB
74 Analysis of the Nash equilibrium
represents the case of flat aPDP.
Using these hypotheses, the matrices Dαk and D
β
k can be expressed in terms of
{Dαk}l = σk · Λ
− l−1
2(L−1) · u [L− l] , (4.35){
Dβk
}
l
= σk · Λ
− l−1
2(L−1) · u [r · L− l] , (4.36)
respectively, where
u [n] =

1, n ≥ 0,0, n < 0. (4.37)
In the following subsections, the model described above is employed to obtain closed-
form expressions for the interference when PRake receivers are implemented at the
AP.
4.2.2 PRake with exponentially decaying aPDP
Prop. 4 In the asymptotic case where the hypotheses of Theorem 5 hold, when adopt-
ing a PRake with LP coefficients according to the MRC scheme,
ζ−1k
a.s.
→
K − 1
N
· µ (Λ, r) , (4.38)
where
µ (Λ, r) =
(Λ− 1) · Λr−1
Λr − 1
, (4.39)
and r , LP /L, 0 < r ≤ 1.
For the sake of presentation, the proof is provided in Appendix B.1.
Prop. 5 In the asymptotic case where the hypotheses of Theorem 6 hold, when adopt-
ing a PRake with LP coefficients according to the MRC scheme,
γ−10,k
a.s.
→
1
N
· ν (Λ, r, ρ) , (4.40)
where ρ , Nc/L, 0 < ρ <∞, r , LP /L, 0 < r ≤ 1, and
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ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


Λ (Λρ − 1)
(
4Λ2r + 3Λρ − 1
)
− 2Λr+ρ (Λr + 3Λ− 1) ρ log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ1+ρ log Λ
,
if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ min(r, 1− r); (4.41a)
Λ (4Λρ − 1)
(
Λ2r − 1
)
− 2Λr+ρ (3Λr − ρ+ Λrρ) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ1+ρ log Λ
,
if min(r, 1− r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1− r)
and r ≤ 1/2; (4.41b)
−4Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ + 3Λ2+2ρ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ
,
+
−2Λ1+r+ρ (r + 3Λρ+ Λrρ− 1) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ
,
if min(r, 1− r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1− r)
and r ≥ 1/2; (4.41c)
−Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ
,
+
−2Λ1+r+ρ (r + 3Λr + Λrρ− 1) log Λ
2 (Λr − 1)2 ρΛ2+ρ log Λ
,
if max(r, 1− r) ≤ ρ ≤ 1; (4.41d)
2Λ
(
Λ2r − 1
)
− (Λr + r + 3Λr − 1)Λr log Λ
(Λr − 1)2 ρΛ logΛ
,
if ρ ≥ 1. (4.41e)
The proof can be found in Appendix B.2.
Propositions 4 and 5 give accurate approximations for the MAI and SI terms in the
general case of PRake receivers at the AP and of an exponentially decaying aPDP.
Furthermore, these results confirm that the approximations are independent of large-
scale fading models, as claimed in [15], since they do not depend on the variance of
the users.
It is also possible to obtain results for more specific scenarios using (4.38) and (4.40)
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with particular values of Λ and r, as shown in the following.
4.2.3 PRake with flat aPDP
The results presented above can be used to study the case of a channel model assuming
flat aPDP. As already mentioned, the flat aPDP model is captured when Λ = 1. In
order to obtain expressions suitable for this case, it is sufficient to let Λ go to 1 in
both (4.38) and (4.40). The former yields
lim
Λ→1
µ (Λ, r) =
1
r
, (4.42)
whereas the result given by the latter is
lim
Λ→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


2r2 + 2r − 4ρr + ρ2
2r2
,
if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ min(r, 1 − r); (4.43a)
1
2
(
2− ρ
r
+
r
ρ
− 1
)
,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1− r)
and r ≤ 1/2; (4.43b)
r3 + r2(9ρ− 3) + r(3 − 9ρ2) + 4ρ3 − 3ρ2 + 3ρ− 1
6ρr2
,
if min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1− r)
and r ≥ 1/2; (4.43c)
4r3 − 3r2 + 3r + (ρ− 1)3
6ρr2
,
if max(r, 1− r) ≤ ρ ≤ 1; (4.43d)
4r2 − 3r + 3
6ρr
,
if ρ ≥ 1. (4.43e)
4.2.4 ARake with exponentially decaying aPDP
The results of Props. 4-5 can also describe the model of a wireless network using
ARake receivers at the AP. As noticed in Sect. 2.2.2, an ARake receiver is a PRake
receiver with r = 1. Letting r go to 1 in (4.38) and (4.40), it is possible to obtain
approximations for the MAI and SI terms in a multipath channel with exponentially
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decaying aPDP as follows:
µA (Λ) = lim
r→1
µ (Λ, r) = 1, (4.44)
νA (Λ, ρ) = lim
r→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =
=


2
(
Λ2 − 1 + Λρ − Λ2−ρ − 2Λρ logΛ
)
(Λ− 1)2 ρ log Λ
, if ρ ≤ 1,
2
(
Λ2 − 1− 2Λ logΛ
)
(Λ− 1)2 ρ log Λ
, if ρ ≥ 1.
(4.45)
It is worth noting that the result for ρ ≤ 1 in (4.45) has been obtained by letting
r→ 1 in (4.41c).
4.2.5 ARake with flat aPDP
The simplest case is represented by a wireless network using the ARake receivers at
the AP, where the channel is assumed to have a flat aPDP. This situation can be
captured by simultaneously letting both Λ and r go to 1 in (4.38) and (4.40). This
approach gives
lim
Λ→1,
r→1
µ (Λ, r) = 1, (4.46)
lim
Λ→1,
r→1
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =


2
3
(
ρ2 − 3ρ+ 3
)
, if ρ ≤ 1,
2
3ρ
, if ρ ≥ 1.
(4.47)
As in (4.45), the result for ρ ≤ 1 in (4.47) has been obtained by letting r → 1,Λ→ 1
in (4.41c).
4.2.6 Comments on the results
This subsection contains some comments on the results provided by Props. 4-5, applied
both to the general case of the PRake receivers with an exponentially decaying aPDP
and to its subcases.
Fig. 4.3 shows the shape of the term µ (Λ, r), proportional to the MAI as in (4.38),
versus the ratio r for some values of Λ. The solid line represents Λ = 0 dB, while
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Figure 4.3: Shape of µ (Λ, r) versus r for some values of Λ.
the dashed and the dotted line depict Λ = 10 dB and Λ = 20 dB, respectively. As
can be seen, µ (Λ, r) decreases as either Λ or r increases. Keeping r fixed, it makes
sense that µ (Λ, r) is a decreasing function of Λ, since the received power of the other
users is lower as Λ increases. Keeping Λ fixed, it makes sense that µ (Λ, r) is a
decreasing function of r, since the receiver uses a higher number of coefficients, thus
better mitigating the effect of MAI. Furthermore, it can be seen that, for an ARake,
limr→1 µ (Λ, r) = µA (Λ) = 1 irrespectively of Λ.
Fig. 4.4 shows the shape of the term ν (Λ, r, ρ), proportional to the SI as in (4.40),
versus the ratio r for some values of Λ and ρ. The solid line represents Λ = 0 dB, while
the dashed and the dotted line depict Λ = 10 dB and Λ = 20 dB, respectively. The
circles represent ρ = 0.25, while the square markers and the rhombi report the shape of
ν (Λ, r, ρ) for ρ = 1.0 and ρ = 4.0, respectively. As can be verified, ν (Λ, r, ρ) decreases
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Figure 4.4: Shape of ν (Λ, r, ρ) versus r for some values of Λ and ρ.
as either ρ or Λ increases. This behavior of ν (Λ, r, ρ) with respect to ρ is justified by
the higher resistance to multipath due to increasing the number of possible positions
and thus the length of a single frame. This also agrees with the results of [50], where
it has been shown that, for a fixed total processing gain N , systems with higher Nc
outperform those with smaller Nc, due to higher mitigation of SI. Similarly to µ (Λ, r),
it makes sense that ν (Λ, r, ρ) is a decreasing function of Λ when r and ρ are fixed,
since the neglected paths are weaker as Λ increases. Taking into account the behavior
of ν (Λ, r, ρ) as a function of r, it can be verified, either analytically or graphically, that
ν (Λ, r, ρ) is not monotonically decreasing as r increases. In other words, an ARake
receiver using MRC does not offer the optimum performance in mitigating the effect
of SI, but it is outperformed by the PRake receivers whose r decreases as Λ increases.
This behavior is due to the fact that the receiver uses MRC, which attempts to gather
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all the signal energy to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and substantially
ignores the effects of SI [70]. In this scenario, a minimum mean square error (MMSE)
combining criterion [49], while more complex, might give a different comparison.
4.3 Performance of the Nash equilibrium
4.3.1 Analytical results
Making use of the previous analysis, it is possible to study the performance of
the PRake receivers when the power control techniques described in Chapter 3 are
adopted. Using Props. 4 and 5 in (3.1) and (4.5), it is straightforward to obtain the
expressions for transmit powers p∗k and utilities u
∗
k achieved at the Nash equilibrium,
which are independent of the channel realizations of the other users, and of SI:
p∗k
a.s.
→
1
h
(SP)
k
·
Nσ2Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
, (4.48)
u∗k
a.s.
→ h
(SP)
k ·
D
M
Rk · f
(
Γ
(
N
ν (Λ, r, ρ)
))
×
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
Nσ2Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
) . (4.49)
Note that (4.48)-(4.49) require knowledge of the channel realization for user k (through
h
(SP)
k ).
Analogously, (4.3) translates into the system design parameter
Nf ≥
⌈
Γ
(
N
ν (Λ, r, ρ)
)
·
(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)
Nc
⌉
, (4.50)
where ⌈·⌉ is the ceiling operator. Since the inequality (4.50) is independent of the chan-
nel realizations, it can serves as a design parameter, in that it specifies the minimum
number of framesNf that allows all users in the network to achieve the optimum SINR
level γ∗k without transmitting at the maximum power p. As a consequence, (4.50) is
expedient to evaluate the minimum spreading factor N required by the network to
provide optimal performance (in the noncooperative sense).
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Prop. 6 In the asymptotic case where the hypotheses of Theorems 5-6 hold, the loss
Ψ of a PRake receiver with respect to an ARake receiver in terms of achieved utilities
converges a.s. to
Ψ =
u∗kA
u∗k
a.s.
→ µ (Λ, r) ·
f
(
Γ
(
N
νA(Λ,ρ)
))
f
(
Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)) · Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
Γ
(
N
νA(Λ,ρ)
)
×
N − Γ
(
N
νA(Λ,ρ)
)
[(K − 1)µA (Λ) + νA (Λ, ρ)]
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
[(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
, (4.51)
where u∗kA is the utility achieved by an ARake receiver.
Proof At the Nash equilibrium, the transmit power for user k when using an ARake
receiver at the AP, p∗kA , can be obtained from (4.5):
p∗kA =
1
hk
·
σ2Γ (γ0,kA)
1− Γ (γ0,kA) ·
(
γ−10,kA + ζ
−1
kA
) , (4.52)
where the subscript A serves to emphasize that we are considering the case of an
ARake, and where we have used the fact that h
(SP)
k is equal to the channel gain
hk = α
H
k ·αk = ||αk||
2
. Hence, (4.51) becomes
Ψ =
hk
h
(SP)
k
·
f (Γ (γ0,kA))
f (Γ (γ0,k))
·
Γ (γ0,k)
Γ (γ0,kA)
·
1− Γ (γ0,kA) ·
(
γ−10,kA + ζ
−1
kA
)
1− Γ (γ0,k) ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) . (4.53)
To show that Ψ converges a.s. to the non-random limit of (4.51), it is convenient to
rewrite the ratio hk/h
(SP)
k as
hk
h
(SP)
k
=
1
Lα
H
k ·αk
1
Lβ
H
k ·αk
. (4.54)
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 5, it is possible to prove that
1
L
αHk ·αk
a.s.
→ ϕ
(
(Dαk )
2
)
(4.55)
and, analogously,
1
L
βHk ·αk
a.s.
→ ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
)
. (4.56)
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Table 4.2: List of parameters used in the simulations.
M , total number of bits per packet 100 b
D, number of information bits per packet 100 b
R, bit rate 100 kb/s
σ2, AWGN power at the receiver 5× 10−16W
p, maximum power constraint 1µW
Taking into account (4.35),
ϕ
(
(Dαk )
2
)
= lim
L→∞
σ2k
L
L∑
l=1
Λ−
l−1
L−1
= σ2k ·
Λ− 1
Λ logΛ
. (4.57)
Using (4.54) and (4.57), and considering the proof of Prop. 4, reported in Appendix
B.1, particularly (B.1),
hk
h
(SP)
k
a.s.
→ µ (Λ, r) , (4.58)
where µ (Λ, r) is defined as in (4.39).
Making use of (4.38), (4.40), (4.44), (4.45) and (4.58), when the hypotheses of
Theorems 5-6 hold, (4.53) converges a.s. to (4.51). 
Equation (4.51) also provides a system design criterion. Given L, Nc, Nf , K and
Λ, a desired loss Ψ can in fact be achieved using the ratio r obtained by numeri-
cally inverting (4.51). Unlike (4.48)-(4.49), this result is independent of all channel
realizations.
4.3.2 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we show numerical results for the analysis presented in the previous
subsection. Simulations are performed using the iterative algorithm described in detail
in Sect. 3.4. The systems we examine have the design parameters listed in Table 4.2.
We use the efficiency function f (γk) = (1− e
−γk/2)M as a reasonable approximation
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Figure 4.5: Probability of having at least one user transmitting at maximum power versus
number of frames.
to the PSR [50,110]. To model the UWB scenario, the channel gains are assumed as
in Sect. 4.2.1, with σ2k = 0.3d
−2
k , where dk is the distance between the kth user and
the AP. Distances are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 3 and 20m.
Fig. 4.5 shows the probability Po of having at least one user transmitting at the
maximum power, i.e., Po = Pr{maxk pk = p = 1µW}, as a function of the number
of frames Nf . We consider 10 000 realizations of the channel gains, using a network
with K = 8 users, Nc = 50, L = 200 (thus ρ = 0.25), and PRake receivers with
LP = 20 coefficients (and thus r = 0.1). The solid line represents the case Λ =
0 dB, while the dashed and the dash-dotted lines depict the cases Λ = 10 dB and
Λ = 20 dB, respectively. Note that the slope of Po increases as Λ increases. This
phenomenon is due to reducing the effects of neglected path gains as Λ becomes
higher, which, given Nf , results in having more homogeneous effects of neglected
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Figure 4.6: Achieved utility versus channel gain at the Nash equilibrium for different Rake
receiver complexities r.
gains. Using the parameters above in (4.50), the minimum value of Nf that allows
all K users to simultaneously achieve the optimum SINRs is Nf = {21, 9, 6} for
Λ = {0 dB, 10 dB, 20 dB}, respectively. As can be seen, the analytical results closely
match those from simulations, and thus (4.50) can be used to evaluate the minimum
spreading factor N of the network, as already stated in Sect. 4.3.1. It is worth
emphasizing that (4.50) is valid for both L and LP going to∞, as stated in Props. 4-
5. In this example, LP = 20, which does not fulfill this hypothesis. This explains
the slight mismatch between theoretical and simulation results, especially for small
Λ’s. However, showing numerical results for a feasible system is more interesting than
simulating a network with a very high number of PRake coefficients.
Fig. 4.6 shows a comparison between analytical and numerical achieved utilities as a
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function of the channel gains hk = ||αk||
2
. The network has the following parameters:
K = 8, L = 200, Nc = 50, Nf = 20, Λ = 10 dB, ρ = 0.25. The markers correspond
to the simulation results given by a single realization of the path gains. Some values
of the number of coefficients of the PRake receiver are considered. In particular, the
square markers report the results for the ARake (r = 1), while triangles, circles and
rhombi show the cases r = {0.5, 0.3, 0.1}, respectively. The solid line represents the
theoretical achieved utility, computed using (4.49). The dashed, the dash-dotted
and the dotted lines have been obtained by subtracting from (4.49) the loss Ψ,
computed as in (4.51). Using the parameters above, Ψ = {1.34 dB, 2.94 dB, 8.38 dB}
for r = {0.5, 0.3, 0.1}, respectively. As before, the larger the number of LP coefficients
is, the smaller the difference between theoretical analysis and simulations is. It is
worth noting that the theoretical results do not consider the actual values of h
(SP)
k ,
as required in (4.49),2 since they make use of the asymptotic approximation (4.51).
As can be verified, the analytical results closely match the actual performance of the
PRake receivers, especially recalling that the results are not averaged. Only a single
random channel realization is in fact considered, because we want to emphasize that
not only this approximation is accurate on average, but also that the normalized
mean square error (nmse) nmse (u∗k) = E
{[(
u∗kA/Ψ− u
∗
k
)
/u∗k
]2}
is considerably low,
where E{·} denotes expectation; u∗kA and Ψ are computed following (4.49) and (4.51),
respectively; and u∗k represents the experimental utility at the Nash equilibrium. In
fact, by averaging over 10 000 channel realizations using the same network parameters,
nmse (u∗k) = {1.4 × 10
−3, 5.9 × 10−3, 6.3 × 10−2} for r = {0.5, 0.3, 0.1}, respectively,
As a conclusion, this allows every network fulfilling the above described hypotheses
to be studied with the proposed tools.
Fig. 4.7 shows the loss Ψ versus the ratio r for some values of Λ and ρ. The network
parameters are set as follows: K = 8, Nf = 20, and L = 200. The solid lines
represent Λ = 0 dB, while the dashed lines depict Λ = 10 dB. The circles represent
Nc = 50 (and thus ρ = 0.25), while the square markers report Nc = 200 (and thus
ρ = 1.0). As is obvious, Ψ is a decreasing function of r. Furthermore, Ψ is a decreasing
function of Λ, since the received power associated to the paths neglected by the PRake
receiver is lower as Λ increases. Similarly, keeping the number of multiple paths L
fixed, Ψ decreases as ρ increases. This complies with theory [50], since increasing the
2This is also valid for the case ARake, since h
(SP)
k = hk.
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Figure 4.7: Shape of the loss Ψ versus r for some values of Λ and ρ.
processing gain provides higher robustness against multipath. As a consequence, a
system with a lower ρ benefits more from a higher number of fingers at the receiver
than a system with a higher ρ does. Hence, when ρ is lower, a PRake receiver performs
worse, i.e., Ψ is higher.
It is worth stating that the proposed analysis is mainly focused on energy efficiency.
Hence, the main performance index here is represented by the achieved utility at
the Nash equilibrium. However, more traditional measures of performance such as
SINR or BER can be obtained using the parameters derived here. In fact, typical
target SINRs at the AP can be computed using γ∗k = Γ (N/ν (Λ, r, ρ)), as derived
in the previous sections. Similarly, the BER can be approximated by Q
(√
γ∗k
)
[50],
where Q(·) denotes the complementary cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal random variable.
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Figure 4.8: Achieved utility versus channel gain at the Nash equilibrium for the ARake
receiver using the channel model [28].
It is interesting to observe that, in the case of ARake receivers in a flat-fading
environment (Λ = 0 dB), the results derived in Sect. 4.2.5 can also capture a more
realistic UWB scenario, simulated according to the model described in [28]. As an
example, Fig. 4.8 shows the utilities achieved at the Nash equilibrium as functions
of the channel gains hk. These results have been obtained using random channel
realizations for K = 16 users. The number of possible pulse positions is Nc = 100,
while the number of paths is L = 60, in order to satisfy the large system assumption
with νA (Λ = 0 dB, ρ = 1.67) = 0.4. The number of frame is Nf = 10, thus leading to
a processing gain N = 1000≫ K. The line represents the theoretical values of (4.49)
when using an ARake, whereas the square markers report the simulations results. We
can see that the simulations match closely with the theoretical results.
Chapter 5
Social optimality of the Nash
solution
The outcome of the distributed power control algorithm (the Nash equilibrium) for
the UWB-based wireless network modeled in Chapter 2 has been thoroughly discussed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. To evaluate how effective the Nash equilibrium is, i.e.,
to compare its performance to that of other power allocation schemes, it is impor-
tant to measure the loss of the distributed solution with respect to the centralized
optimization. As already outlined in Sect. 1.2.3, this comparison is motivated by the
need to assess the tradeoff between pros and cons of a decentralized scheme.
In particular, Sect. 5.1 provides an analytical comparison between the two ap-
proaches using the large-system analysis proposed in the previous chapter. Sect. 5.2
presents some numerical results to support the theoretical conclusions.
5.1 Analytical results
Using the definitions introduced in Sect. 1.2.3, the solution to the power control game
is said to be Pareto-optimal if there exists no other power allocation p for which one
or more users can improve their utilities without reducing the utility of any of the
other users. It can be shown that the Nash equilibrium presented in Chapter 4 is not
Pareto-optimal [110]. This means that it is possible to improve the utility of one or
more users without harming other users. On the other hand, it can be shown that
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the solution to the following social problem gives the Pareto-optimal frontier [85]
p˜ = arg max
p
K∑
k=1
λkuk (p), (5.1)
for λk ∈ R+ (the set of positive real numbers). Pareto-optimal solutions are, in
general, difficult to obtain. Here, we conjecture that the Pareto-optimal solution
occurs when all users achieve the same SINRs, γ˜. This approach is chosen not only
because SINR balancing ensures fairness among users in terms of throughput and
delay [85], but also because, for large systems, the Nash equilibrium is achieved when
all SINRs are similar. We also consider the hypothesis λ1 = · · · = λK = 1, suitable for
a scenario without priority classes. Hence, the summation presented in (5.1) reduces
to
unetwork (p) =
K∑
k=1
uk (p), (5.2)
which is analogous to the performance parameter introduced in Sect. 1.4.1 as a mea-
sure of the efficiency of the distributed solution. As a consequence, the maximization
(5.1) can be written as
p˜ = arg max
p
f (γ (p))(∑K
k=1 p
−1
k
)−1 . (5.3)
In a network where the hypotheses of Assumption 1, Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are
fulfilled, and the channel is modeled as stated in Sect. 4.2.1, at the Nash equilibrium
all users achieve a certain output SINR γk with h
(SP)
k p
∗
k ≃ q (γk), where
q (γ) =
Nσ2γ
N − γ · [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
, (5.4)
with ρ = Nc/L. Therefore, (5.3) can be expressed as
γk = arg max
γ
f (γ)
q (γ)
K∑
k=1
h
(SP)
k ≃ γ˜, (5.5)
since there exists a one-to-one correspondence between γ and p. It should be noted
that, while the maximizations in (3.5) consider no cooperation among users, (5.3)
assumes that users cooperate in choosing their transmit powers. That means that the
relationship between the user’s SINR and transmit power will be different from that
in the noncooperative case.
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Prop. 7 In a network where L,Nc → ∞ and N ≫ K, the Nash equilibrium ap-
proaches the socially optimal solution in terms of total network utility unetwork (p).
Proof The solution γ˜ to (5.5) must satisfy the first-order necessary optimizing con-
dition d (f (γ) /q (γ)) /dγ|γ=γ˜ = 0. Using this fact, combined with (5.4), gives us the
equation that must be satisfied by the solution of the maximization problem in (5.5):
f ′(γ˜) · γ˜
[
1− γ˜ ·
(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)
N
]
= f (γ˜) . (5.6)
We see from (5.6) that the socially optimal solution differs from the solution (3.6) of
the noncooperative utility-maximizing method, since (5.6) also takes into account the
contribution of the interferers. In particular,
γ˜ = Γ
(
N
(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)
)
. (5.7)
Since the function Γ (·) is increasing with its argument for any S-shaped f (γ) (as can
also be seen in Fig. 4.1), and since N/ [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)] ≤ N/ν (Λ, r, ρ) ≅
γ0,k for all k [from (4.38) and (4.40)],
γ˜ ≤ γ∗k ≤ γ
∗, (5.8)
due to (4.1) and (5.7), where γ∗ = Γ (∞) is the SINR at the Nash equilibrium for the
flat-fading scenario. On the other hand, assuming N ≫ K and 0 < ρ < ∞ implies
γ˜ → γ∗. From (5.8), it is apparent that γ∗k → γ
∗ as well. This means that, in almost
all typical scenarios, the target SINR for the noncooperative game, γ∗k , is close to the
target SINR for the socially optimal solution, γ˜. Consequently, the average utility
provided by the Nash equilibrium is close to the one achieved according to the socially
optimal solution. 
The validity of this theoretical analysis is confirmed by numerical results presented
in the remainder of this chapter.
5.2 Simulation results
Fig. 5.1 shows the normalized utility uk/hk as a function of the ratio ρ. We consider
10 000 random realization of a network with K = 16 users, Nf = 20 frames, L = 100
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Table 5.1: List of parameters used in the simulations.
M , total number of bits per packet 100 b
D, number of information bits per packet 100 b
R, bit rate 100 kb/s
σ2, AWGN power at the receiver 5× 10−16W
p, maximum power constraint 1µW
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of the normalized utility versus the load factor for the noncooper-
ative and socially optimal solutions.
and PRake receivers with LP = 50 fingers at the AP (and thus r = 0.5). The
other parameters can be found in Table 5.1. The lines represent theoretical values
of Nash equilibrium (NE) (dotted line), using (4.49), and of the social optimum
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the target SINR versus load factor for the noncooperative and
socially optimal solutions.
(SO) solution (solid line), using (3.3) with γk = γ˜ that follows from the numerical
solution of (5.3). The markers correspond to the simulation results, which use the
efficiency function f (γk) = (1 − e−γk/2)M presented for the previous results. The
channel is modeled following the considerations presented in Sect. 4.2.1. The circles
represent the averaged solution of the iterative algorithm (3.15), while the square
markers show averaged numerical results (through a complete numerical search) of
the maximization (5.1), with λk = 1. As can be seen, the difference between the
noncooperative approach and the socially optimal solution is vanishingly small.
Similar conclusions can be drawn by inspecting Fig. 5.2, which compares the target
SINRs of the noncooperative solutions with the target SINRs of the socially optimal
solutions. As before, the lines correspond to the theoretical values, while the markers
represent the simulation results. It is seen that, in both cases, the average target
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Table 5.2: Average loss of the Nash solution with respect to the social optimum.
ρ unetwork (p˜) /unetwork (p
∗) [ dB]
0.50 0.67
0.75 0.35
1.00 0.21
1.25 0.14
1.50 0.10
1.75 0.08
2.00 0.06
SINRs for the Nash equilibrium, γ∗, and the average target SINRs for the social
optimum solution, γ˜, are very close to γ∗, as shown in Prop. 7.
Table 5.2 shows the average loss of the Nash equilibrium with respect to the social
optimum solution as a function of the load factor ρ when the total utility of the
network unetwork (p) is considered. In particular, we report the average loss of the
distributed solution (Nash equilibrium) with respect to the centralized solution (social
optimum) over 10 000 realization of the network, with the following parameters: K =
16 users, Nf = 20 frames, L = 100 and PRake receivers with LP = 50 fingers at
the AP (and thus r = 0.5). It is interesting to note that, although the Nash solution
performs similarly to the centralized solution in terms of normalized utility (see Figs.
5.1 and 5.2), the difference in terms of the effective unetwork (p) is not negligible.
However, such loss, far below 1 dB for any ρ, can be considered acceptable if compared
to the notable advantages of a distributed algorithm discussed in Sect. 3.1.
Furthermore, another prominent feature of the Nash solution can be identified by
inspecting the two approaches much in detail. Fig. 5.3 reports the transmit power
as a function of the channel gain for an example network using the same parame-
ters employed for the results of Table 5.2. In the considered network, the channel
conditions are rather unbalanced among the users, i.e., the near-far effect is stronger
and an effective power control scheme is particularly desirable. The square markers
represent the transmit power p˜k of the (numerical) socially optimal solution, whereas
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Figure 5.3: Transmit power versus channel gain for noncooperative and socially optimal
solutions for an example network realization.
the circles report the power p∗k at the Nash equilibrium, obtained through the BRPC
algorithm. As can be seen, the optimal solution from the point of view of the network
is that power allocation that allows users with good channel conditions to transmit
at considerable powers (and thus to achieve a relevant throughput) while preventing
users with bad channel conditions from transmitting. This outcome resembles the wa-
terfilling solution used for digital subscriber line (DSL) [118]. In fact, if the network is
considered as a unique entity aiming at maximizing the energy efficiency, the aggregate
ratio throughput to transmit power can be maximized when the channel gains of the
transmitting terminals are above a certain threshold. As a consequence, although p˜
provides the maximum total energy efficiency of the network, such allocation is highly
unfair.
This can be verified in Fig. 5.4, where the achieved utilities are plotted as functions
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Figure 5.4: Achieved utility versus channel gain for noncooperative and socially optimal
solutions for an example network realization.
of the channel gains for the distributed solution (circles) and the socially optimal
solution (square markers), respectively. Due to the choice of a logarithmic scale
for the utilities, Fig. 5.4 does not report the utilities achieved at the socially optimal
solution for users with lower channel gains. For these users, uk (p˜) = 0. Alternatively,
the Nash equilibrium guarantees fairness to the network, since every user is allowed
to communicate with the AP. In this situation, the claims used in the proof of Prop. 7
do not hold anymore, since the SINR at the social optimum γ˜k is different for each
user (more precisely, γ˜k ≅ γ
∗
k for users with good channel conditions, and γ˜k ≅ 0
for users with bad channel conditions). However, it is interesting to note that the
contributions of users with bad channel conditions in terms of the aggregate utility are
marginal. Therefore, the final conclusions about the performance of noncooperative
(distributed) and centralized solutions still hold. This is in fact confirmed by the
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results of Table 5.2, which provides the evidence that fairness can be achieved at the
expense of a reduced overall network utility on the order of fractions of decibel.
Chapter 6
Comparison between UWB
and CDMA networks
The analysis of noncooperative power control schemes conducted so far has been
primarily focused on high-speed infrastructure data networks using UWB technology
as the multiple access technique. As motivated in Sect. 2.1, UWB technology can
represent a breakthrough solution to design state-of-the-art data networks thanks to
the numerous appealing features outlined in Sect. 2.1. In addition to UWB, another
effective option to perform multiple access in wideband wireless networks is provided
by DS-CDMA (here abbreviated CDMA). CDMA is in fact a mature access technique
for wireless networking, due to its well-known robustness and ease of implementation
[102].
It is thus interesting to compare the performance of the two access schemes in terms
of achieved utility at the Nash equilibrium. As already stated in Sect. 2.2.2, the large
bandwidth occupancy of the transmitted signals implies the frequency selectivity of
the channel. To perform a fair comparison, systems with equal spreading factor
operating in a dense multipath environment are considered.
Both the frequency-selective and the flat-fading scenarios are considered. In partic-
ular, Sect. 6.1 contains the analytical tools to evaluate the performance of the two
access schemes in the frequency-selective environment, whereas Sect. 6.2 analyzes
the performance in flat-fading channels. Simulations are provided to validate the
theoretical results.
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6.1 Frequency-selective fading
A wideband wireless network employing UWB technology as the multiple access
technique can be modeled as described in Sect. 2.2. Applying the power control
algorithm proposed in Chapter 3, and using the large-system analysis developed in
Chapter 4, the utility achieved at the Nash equilibrium can be evaluated using (4.49),
which is reported here for the reader’s convenience:
u∗kU
a.s.
→ h
(SP)
k ·
D
M
Rk · f
(
Γ
(
N
ν (Λ, r, ρ)
))
×
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
Nσ2Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
) , (6.1)
where the subscript U is used to emphasize that this approximation applies to the
UWB-based network [11].
To derive an analogous result for the case of a CDMA-based network, it is worth
resorting to the UWB signal model developed in detail in Sect. 2.2.1. In this model,
it is straightforward to note that (2.1) can describe the uplink signal of a random
CDMA system with spreading factor N and K users in the special when Tf = Tc (and
thus Nc = 1). In fact, when Nc = 1, the ternary sequence s
(k) introduced in (2.2)
reduces to a binary sequence with independent chips s
(k)
n = ±1. As a consequence,
the sufficient statistic for detecting information symbols can be written similarly to
that of classical CDMA systems [50].
This remark allows us to apply the framework developed in the previous chapters
to CDMA-based networks as well, provided that Nc = 1.
Prop. 8 Assume that α
(k)
l are zero-mean RVs independent across k and l, and G is
a deterministic diagonal matrix (thus implying that α
(k)
l and β
(j)
m are dependent only
when j = k and m = l). In the asymptotic case where the number of users K and the
number of frames Nf are finite, while the number of paths is L→∞, the term utility
achieved at the Nash equilibrium u∗kC converges a.s. to
u∗kC
a.s.
→ h
(SP)
k ·
D
M
Rk · f
(
Γ
(
N
ν0 (Λ, r)
))
×
N − Γ
(
N
ν0(Λ,r)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν0 (Λ, r)]
Nσ2Γ
(
N
ν0(Λ,r)
) , (6.2)
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where the subscript C denotes a CMDA-based network, and
ν0 (Λ, r) =
Λ + Λr − 2Λ1+r
Λ − Λ1+r
. (6.3)
Proof The achieved utility u∗kC can be derived making use of the results presented
in Chapter 4. In particular, Prop. 5 can be adapted to the case of a CDMA network
by letting the ratio ρ = Nc/L go to 0, as follows from the condition Nc = 1. Hence,
the term proportional to SI becomes
ν0 (Λ, r) = lim
ρ→0
ν (Λ, r, ρ) =
Λ + Λr − 2Λ1+r
Λ− Λ1+r
, (6.4)
as stated in (6.3). Using (6.3) in (6.1), the result (6.2) is straightforward. 
Fig. 6.1 shows the shape of ν (Λ, r, ρ) as a function of r for some values of Λ and ρ.
With a slight abuse of notation, ν0 (Λ, r) is reported as ν (Λ, r, 0) (triangular markers),
while circles and square markers depict ρ = 0.25 and ρ = 1.0, respectively. As can
be noted, ν0 (Λ, r) > ν (Λ, r, ρ1) > ν (Λ, r, ρ2) for any ρ2 > ρ1 > 0. This result is
justified by the higher resistance to multipath due to increasing the length of a single
frame [50]. Furthermore, keeping ρ fixed, ν (Λ, r, ρ) decreases both as Λ and as r
increases. The first behavior makes sense, since the effect of multipath (and thus of
SI) is higher in channels with lower Λ. The second behavior reflects the fact that
exploiting the diversity by adding a higher number of fingers (and thus increasing r)
results in better mitigating the frequency-selective fading.
As already stated in the introduction, the performance of the two access schemes
can compared fairly when the respective networks show the same spreading factor.
Since a CDMA-based network can be treated as a UWB-based network with Nc = 1,
the assignment Nf = N most hold.
Prop. 9 When L→∞, the loss Ω of a CDMA system with respect to a UWB scheme
with Nc possible pulse positions converges a.s. to
Ω , 10 log10(u
∗
kU /u
∗
kC )
a.s.
→ (10 log10 e) · ω [dB] (6.5)
where
ω ,
Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
·∆ν (Λ, r, ρ)
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
, (6.6)
with ∆ν (Λ, r, ρ) = ν0 (Λ, r)− ν (Λ, r, ρ).
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Figure 6.1: Shape of ν (Λ, r, ρ) versus r for some values of Λ and ρ.
Proof Recalling (3.6), it can be noted that the slope of Γ (γ0,k) is very small for
large values of γ0,k. Using the hypothesis N ≫ K > 1, a good approximation for
Γ (N/ν0 (Λ, r)) is Γ (N/ν (Λ, r, ρ)). Therefore, using (6.1),
u∗kU
u∗kC
≅
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν (Λ, r, ρ)]
N − Γ
(
N
ν(Λ,r,ρ)
)
· [(K − 1)µ (Λ, r) + ν0 (Λ, r)]
(6.7)
=
1
1− ω
, (6.8)
with ω defined as in (6.6). Recalling that N ≫ 1, it is easy to verify that ω ≪ 1.
Hence, using a first-order Taylor series approximation, the result (6.5) is straightfor-
ward. 
As already specified (see also Fig. 6.1), ∆ν (Λ, r, ρ) > 0 for any ρ > 0. Hence, Prop. 9
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Table 6.1: List of parameters used in the simulations.
M , total number of bits per packet 100 b
D, number of information bits per packet 100 b
R, bit rate 100 kb/s
σ2, AWGN power at the receiver 5× 10−16W
p, maximum power constraint 1µW
states that, using an equal spreading factor in the same multipath scenario, any UWB
system outperforms the corresponding CDMA schemes. The gap ∆ν (Λ, r, ρ) can thus
interpreted as a measure of how effective increasing the length of a single frame (i.e.,
increasing Nc) is in terms of multipath resistance.
Nevertheless, typical values of the network parameters yield very small values of Ω,
especially as N increases.1 Hence, using game-theoretic power control techniques,
performance of the two multiple access schemes is practically equivalent.
Numerical results confirm this analysis. Simulations are performed using the itera-
tive algorithm described in detail in Sect. 3.4. The systems we examine have the design
parameters listed in Table 6.1. We use the efficiency function f (γk) = (1− e−γk/2)M
as a reasonable approximation to the PSR [50, 110]. To model the UWB scenario,
the channel gains are assumed as in Sect. 4.2.1, with σ2k = 0.3d
−2
k , where dk is the
distance between user k and the access point. Distances are assumed to be uniformly
distributed between 3 and 30m.
Fig. 6.2 shows a comparison between analytical and simulated normalized utilities
u∗k/h
(SP)
k at the Nash equilibrium as a function of the spreading factor N . A network
with K = 10 users is considered, while the aPDP is assumed to be exponentially
decaying with Λ = 20 dB. The number of paths is L = 200, thus satisfying the
large-system assumption. Light and dark lines depict the cases ARake (r = 1) and
PRake (r = 0.2), respectively. Lines represent theoretical results provided by (6.1).
In particular, solid lines show analytical values for CDMA (Nc = 1), while dashed
and dotted lines report the UWB scenario, with Nc = 10 and Nc = 50, respectively.
The markers show the simulation results averaged over 10 000 network realizations.
1As expected, larger spreading factors better mitigate multipath effects.
104 Comparison between UWB and CDMA networks
500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
188.5
189.0
189.5
190.0
190.5
191.0
N
u
∗ k
/
h
(S
P
)
k
[b
/
J
,
d
B
]
ARake (r = 1.0)
PRake (r = 0.2)
CDMA (theoretical)
CDMA (simulated)
UWB (Nc=10) (theoretical)
UWB (Nc=10) (simulated)
UWB (Nc=50) (theoretical)
UWB (Nc=50) (simulated)
K = 10, L = 200,Λ = 20 dB
Figure 6.2: Comparison of normalized utilities versus the spreading factor for RCDMA and
IR-UWB schemes.
As expected, the performance loss of CDMA with respect to UWB is negligible (less
than 1 dB) when compared with the normalized achieved utilities. A first conclusion
is that, based on game-theoretic power control analysis, the performance of these two
multiple access schemes is practically equivalent. Numerical results also show that,
with N fixed, a higher r provides smaller difference in performance between the two
multiple access schemes. This is reasonable, since exploiting the diversity by adding
a higher number of fingers (and thus increasing r) results in better mitigation of
frequency-selective fading.
Similar considerations can be made by examining the results shown in Fig. 6.3, where
we report the loss of CDMA with respect to UWB with Nc = 50. The decay constant
of the channel is assumed to be Λ = 20 dB. Light and dark lines represent K = 10
and K = 20, respectively. The solid lines depict the case ARake, while the dashed
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Figure 6.3: Performance loss of CDMA with respect to UWB for different values of the
system parameters.
lines show the case PRake (r = 0.2). The square markers and the circles report the
theoretical results with L = 200 and L = 500 multiple paths, respectively. It can be
seen that the loss Ω is always very small. In addition, it is seen that Ω decreases as
L increases. This can be justified since UWB cannot further mitigate the effect of
denser and denser multipath in an Nc-fixed scenario, and thus its behavior is more
similar to that of CDMA systems. Note that this statement is not in contrast with the
comments about Fig. 6.2, since the comparison would be completely different if we
considered IR-UWB with fixed N and variable Nc. In fact, if we choose Nc such that
ρ is constant accordingly to the increasing L, Ω remains unchanged, as is apparent
from (6.5)-(6.6).
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6.2 Flat fading
The framework developed in Chapter 4 is also valid to study the performance of
energy-efficient power control in a flat-fading scenario [12]. Even though the asymp-
totic behavior of the achieved utilities at the Nash equilibrium is obtained for a large
number of multiple paths L, the flat-fading scenario can still be captured by letting
the decaying constant Λ go to infinity: Λ→∞.
This mathematical artifice is in fact expedient to describe the case of a single
component by simply reducing the power of the other channel paths to 0. In this
scenario, the Rake receiver at the access point reduces to a simple matched filter.
Hence, for ease of calculation, it is convenient to elaborate on (4.44)-(4.45), derived in
Sect. 4.2.4, for an all-Rake receiver, rather than on (4.38)-(4.41), derived in Sect. 4.2.2
and valid for the general case of PRake.
In particular, (4.44) reports the asymptotic value of the term due to MAI ζ−1k , which
is equal to ζ−1k = (K−1)/N irrespective of all the network parameters (including Λ).
Analogously, (4.45) derives the behavior for the term due to SI γ−10,k. In this case, it
is straightforward to verify that
lim
Λ→∞
νA (Λ, ρ) = 0, (6.9)
and thus γ−10,k
a.s.
→ νA (Λ, ρ) /N = 0. This implies that, under the assumption of flat-
fading,
i) the MAI is independent of the multiple access scheme; and
ii) the SI is null, irrespective of the multiple access scheme.
As a consequence, the utilities achieved at the Nash equilibrium by CDMA-based
schemes is identical to that of UWB-based networks.
This result matches with intuitive considerations. In fact, the absence of multiple
paths (and hence of SI) makes the protection induced by TH vanish. A further support
to this proof can be provided in terms of the TH-UWB spreading sequence s(k). The
dependence of the terms in the sequence is in fact limited to those belonging to the
same frame only. Since each frame contains only one monocycle, the contribution
given by the other time slots can be neglected in terms of power-related issues. It
turns out that the only valuable terms s
(k)
n in the sequence are binary, independent
and identically distributed, which corresponds to the case of the CDMA scheme.
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of normalized utilities versus the spreading factor for CDMA and
UWB schemes.
Fig. 6.4 offers a comparison of theoretical and simulation results for the normalized
utilities for both multiple access schemes. As can be seen, irrespective of the network
parameters, the performance achieved by TH-UWB and CDMA schemes is the same.
To further confirm this finding, the results are also in accordance with the analysis
conducted by Meshkati et al. [85] for the joint maximization of power control and
receiver selection for CDMA wireless networks in the case of flat-fading channels and
matched filters.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and perspectives
In this thesis, we used a game-theoretic approach to study distributed power control
techniques in the uplink of wideband wireless communication networks. In particular,
we focused our research on wireless networks using ultrawideband (UWB) as the
physical-layer multiple access technique. UWB technology is considered to be a
potential candidate for multiuser high-speed data networks. However, the scope of
this thesis is not limited to UWB-based systems, since the proposed framework is
general enough to encompass code division multiple access (CDMA) networks as a
subcase.
The main concern in the identification of the game has been power efficiency. This
has led us to the use of a utility function that maximizes the life of a battery-operated
terminal: the ratio between the correctly delivered bits in a packet versus the energy
spent to deliver those bits.
When each user adopts a best-response strategy, which consists of updating its
transmit power according to the throughput obtained at the access point, all users
achieve a unique stable equilibrium from which no terminal wishes to unilaterally
deviate (the Nash equilibrium). Our large-system analysis suggests that this happens
irrespective of the statistics of the channel taps (assuming a tapped-delay line model),
and of the kind of Rake receiver that is adopted at the access point to cope with
multipath propagation. Such analysis is fairly general and captures a few different
scenarios: the wireless channel can be either frequency-selective with exponential
decay, or frequency-flat, or frequency-selective with flat power delay profile; the
receiver can be either partial- or all-Rake with maximal ratio combining.
Our (closed-form) result for the distributed power control can be compared with
the optimal power allocation in a social sense, which corresponds to a centralized
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solution under the control of the access point. The typical degradation in terms of
energy efficiency of distributed control with respect to such an optimum turns out
to be negligible. This paves the way for the use of game-theoretic power control
techniques in wireless networks when energy efficiency is the main concern.
We also have shown that our framework and the relevant conclusions are further
applicable to classical random CDMA, which pays only a small degradation in terms
of achieved utility with respect to UWB.
The resource allocation schemes presented in this thesis could be further refined by
considering mixed strategies, where the user terminals choose their transmit powers
according to an optimal probability distribution. This introduces additional signal
processing at the mobile terminal, which however does not represent a technological
limit. On the other hand, enlarging the set of allowable powers might increase the
potentiality of the power control algorithm.
Further improvements in the achieved performance could be obtained by modeling
the power control scheme as a repeated game, in which the convergence speed of
the algorithm is considered in the utility function. This solution might mitigate the
additional computational power required by the mixed-strategy scenario.
An alternative approach to pure energy-efficiency-driven control would be replacing
the goodput of the link with its Shannon capacity [43], assuming that the terminal
uses adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) to stay as close as possible to capacity
for each channel condition.
Further benefits can be provided by devising more elaborate cross-layer optimiza-
tions, which consider other aspects of the network. As an example, medium access
control (MAC) schemes can also be considered as part of a more general resource
allocation strategy due to the competitive (and hence game-theoretic) nature of
the medium contention. Some results along these lines can be found in [84]. If
power allocation is designed jointly with the MAC strategy according to the utility-
maximizing criteria described above, more effective resource allocation is guaranteed
to all the terminals in the network.
Appendix A
Properties of random vectors
The results presented in this appendix are introduced to perform the large-system
analysis of the NPCG presented in Chapter 4.
Lemma 2 ([16]) Consider an n-dimensional vector rn = [R1, . . . , Rn] with indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standardized (complex) entries (i.e. E[Ri] = 0
and E[|Ri|2] = 1, with E[·] denoting expectation), and let Cn be an n × n (complex)
matrix independent of rn. For any p ∈ N,
E
[∣∣rHn Cnrn − Tr(Cn)∣∣p] = Kp
((
E
[
|R1|
4
]
Tr
(
CnC
H
n
))p/2
+E
[
|R1|
2p
]
Tr
(
CnC
H
n
)p/2)
, (A.1)
where the constant Kp does not depend either on n or on Cn.
Theorem 7 Consider an n-dimensional vector xn =
1√
n
[X1, . . . , Xn] with i.i.d. stan-
dardized (complex) entries with finite eighth moment, and let Cn be an n×n (complex)
matrix independent of xn with uniformly bounded spectral radius for all n. Under these
hypotheses,
xHn Cnxn
a.s.
→
1
n
Tr(Cn). (A.2)
Proof Using Lemma 2 and Markov’s inequality,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣xHn Cnxn − 1n Tr(Cn)
∣∣∣∣ > ǫ
]
≤
E
[∣∣xHn Cnxn − 1n Tr(Cn)∣∣4]
ǫ4
≤ κ ·
1
n2 · ǫ4
, (A.3)
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where κ <∞ is a constant value independent of n. Thus,
∞∑
n=1
Pr
[∣∣∣∣xHn Cnxn − 1n Tr(Cn)
∣∣∣∣ > ǫ
]
<∞. (A.4)
Using the Borel-Cantelli lemma [21], the result (A.2) is straightforward.
Theorem 8 Suppose xn = [X1, . . . , Xn] and yn = [Y1, . . . , Yn] are n-dimensional
independent vectors with i.i.d. standardized (complex) entries with finite eighth mo-
ment, and Cn is an n×n matrix (complex) independent on xn and yn with uniformly
bounded spectral radius for all n. Then,
xHn Cnyn
a.s.
→ 0. (A.5)
Proof The proof can be obtained using the same steps as that of Theorem 7.
Appendix B
Proofs of Props. 4 and 5
This appendix contains the proofs of Props. 4 and 5, reported in Sect. 4.2.2.
B.1 Proof of Prop. 4
To derive (4.38), we make use of the result (4.18) of Theorem 5. Using the hypotheses
shown in Sect. 4.2, Dαk and D
β
k are represented by (4.35) and (4.36), respectively.
Hence, focusing on the denominator of (4.18),
ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
l=1
{
DαkD
β
k
}
l
= lim
L→∞
σ2k
L
rL∑
l=1
Λ−
l−1
L−1
= σ2k ·
Λr − 1
Λr log Λ
. (B.1)
Analogously,
ϕ
(
DαjD
β
j
)
= σ2j ·
Λr − 1
Λr log Λ
. (B.2)
Using (2.10), (2.11) and (4.34), after some algebraic manipulation, we obtain
{
CαjC
α
j
H
}
ll
=
σ2j
L
(
L∑
m=l+1
Λ−
m−1
L−1
)
u [L− 1− l] , (B.3)
{
CβkC
β
k
H
}
ll
=
σ2k
L
(
rL∑
m=l+1
Λ−
m−1
L−1
)
u [rL− 1− l] , (B.4)
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where u [·] is defined as in (4.37). The terms in the numerator of (4.18) thus translate
into
ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
l=1
{
Dαj
}2
l
{
CβkC
β
k
H
}
ll
= lim
L→∞
σ2kσ
2
j
L2
rL−1∑
l=1
Λ−
l−1
L−1
rL∑
m=l+1
Λ−
m−1
L−1
= σ2kσ
2
j ·
Λ−2r (Λr − 1)2
2 (log Λ)
2 (B.5)
and
ϕ
(
DβkC
α
jC
α
j
HDβk
)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
l=1
{
Dβk
}2
l
{
CαjC
α
j
H
}
ll
= lim
L→∞
σ2kσ
2
j
L2
rL∑
l=1
Λ−
l−1
L−1
L∑
m=l+1
Λ−
m−1
L−1
= σ2kσ
2
j ·
Λ−1−2r (Λr − 1)
(
Λ− 2Λr + Λr+1
)
2 (log Λ)
2 . (B.6)
Using (B.1)-(B.2) and (B.5)-(B.6),
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
a.s.
→
1
N
·
ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
+ ϕ
(
DβkC
α
jC
α
j
HDβk
)
ϕ
(
DαjD
β
j
)
· ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
)
=
1
N
·
(Λ− 1)Λr−1
Λr − 1
. (B.7)
Using (B.7), the result (4.38) is straightforward. 
B.2 Proof of Prop. 5
To derive (4.40), we make use of the result (4.30) of Theorem 5. Using the hypotheses
shown in Sect. 4.2, Dαk and D
β
k are represented by (4.35) and (4.36), respectively.
The denominator can be obtained following the same steps as for the proof of Prop.
4: (
ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
))2
= σ4k ·
(Λr − 1)2
Λ2r (log Λ)2
. (B.8)
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Following (4.31),
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) = σ
4
k · Λ
−L+2l−i−2
L−1 · w [l, i] , (B.9)
where
w [l, i] = u [rL − l] + u [rL − L+ i− l]
+ 2u [rL − l] · u [rL − L+ i− l] (B.10)
has been introduced for convenience of notation.
In order to obtain explicit expressions for w [l, i], it is convenient to split the range
of r into the two following cases.
• r ≤ 1/2: taking into account all the possible values of l and i,
w [l, i] =


4, if L− rL+ 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and
1 ≤ l ≤ rL − L+ i;
1, either if 1 ≤ i ≤ rL and 1 ≤ l ≤ 1,
or if rL ≤ i ≤ L− rL and 1 ≤ l ≤ rL,
or if L− rL + 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and
rL − L+ i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ rL;
0, elsewhere.
(B.11)
Substituting (4.31) and (B.11) in the numerator of (4.30) yields
1
σ4k
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
rL∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
L−rL∑
i=rL+1
φ2i ·
rL∑
l=1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
L−1∑
i=L−rL+1
φ2i ·
rL−L+i∑
l=1
4Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
L−1∑
i=L−rL+1
φ2i ·
rL∑
l=rL−L+i+1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1 ;
(B.12)
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• r ≥ 1/2: taking into account all the possible values of l and i,
w [l, i] =


4, either if L− rL + 1 ≤ i ≤ rL and
1 ≤ l ≤ rL− L+ i,
or if rL + 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and
1 ≤ l ≤ rL − L+ i;
1, either if 1 ≤ i ≤ L− rL and 1 ≤ l ≤ 1,
or if L− rL + 1 ≤ i ≤ rL and
rL− L+ i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ i,
or if rL + 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1 and
rL− L+ i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ rL;
0, elsewhere.
(B.13)
Substituting (4.31) and (B.13) in the numerator of (4.30) yields
1
σ4k
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
L−rL∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
rL∑
i=L−rL+1
φ2i ·
rL−L+i∑
l=1
4Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
rL∑
i=L−rL+1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=rL−L+i+1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
L−1∑
i=rL+1
φ2i ·
rL−L+i∑
l=1
4Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1
+
L−1∑
i=rL+1
φ2i ·
rL∑
l=rL−L+i+1
Λ−
L+2l−i−2
L−1 .
(B.14)
In order to obtain (4.41a)-(4.41e), the explicit values of φ2i must be used. From
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(2.12)-(2.13) follows
φ2i =


(L− i)/Nc, either if Nc ≤ L and
L−Nc + 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1,
or if Nc ≥ L and 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1;
1, if Nc ≤ L and 1 ≤ i ≤ L−Nc.
(B.15)
As in the case of r, it is convenient to separate the range of ρ = Nc/L in the following
cases.
• 0 ≤ ρ ≤ min(r, 1− r): substituting (B.15) in (B.12) and (B.14), they both yield
1
σ4k
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
Λ (Λr − 1)
(
4Λ2r + 3Λρ − 1
)
2Λρ+2r+1ρ (log Λ)
3
−
2Λr+ρ (Λr + 3Λ− 1) ρ log Λ
2Λρ+2r+1ρ (log Λ)
3 . (B.16)
Making use of (4.30), (B.8) and (B.16), the results (4.40) and (4.41a) are
straightforward.
• min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r) and r ≤ 1/2: substituting (B.15) in (B.12)
yields
1
σ4k
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
Λ
(
Λ2r − 1
)
(4Λρ − 1)
2Λρ+2r+1ρ (log Λ)
3
−
2Λr+ρ (3Λr − ρ+ Λrρ) log Λ
2Λρ+2r+1ρ (log Λ)
3 . (B.17)
Making use of (4.30), (B.8) and (B.17), the results (4.40) and (4.41b) are
straightforward.
• min(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ max(r, 1 − r) and r ≥ 1/2: substituting (B.15) in (B.14)
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yields
1
σ4k
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
−4Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ
2Λ2+2r+ρρ (log Λ)3
+
3Λ2+2ρ − 2ρρ+r+1 (Λrρ+ 3Λρ+ r − 1) log Λ
2Λ2+2r+ρρ (log Λ)
3 . (B.18)
Making use of (4.30), (B.8) and (B.18), the results (4.40) and (4.41c) are
straightforward.
• max(r, 1 − r) ≤ ρ ≤ 1: substituting (B.15) into (B.12) and (B.14), they both
yield
1
σ4k
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
−Λ2+2r − 4Λ2+ρ + Λ2(r+ρ) + 4Λ2+2r+ρ
2Λ2+2r+ρρ (log Λ)
3
−
2ρρ+r+1 (Λrρ+ 3Λr + r − 1) log Λ
2Λ2+2r+ρρ (log Λ)
3 . (B.19)
Making use of (4.30), (B.8) and (B.19), the results (4.40) and (4.41d) are
straightforward.
• ρ = Nc/L ≥ 1: substituting (B.15) into (B.12) and (B.14), they both yield
1
σ4k
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i) =
=
2Λ
(
Λ2r − 1
)
− (Λr + r + 3Λr − 1)Λr log Λ
Λ2r+1ρ (log Λ)
3 . (B.20)
Making use of (4.30), (B.8) and (B.20), the results (4.40) and (4.41e) are
straightforward.

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